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Note
White v. Samsung Electronics America: The
Ninth Circuit Turns a New Letter in
California Right of Publicity Law
I. Introduction
In White v. Samsung Electronics America,' game show
hostess Vanna White brought suit against Samsung Electronics
America and its advertising agency, David Deutsch Associates,
* NEWSWEEK, Apr. 5, 1993, at 54.
1. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
1
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alleging the violation of her common law right of publicity2 and
California Civil Code section 3344.3 The defendants in White
produced an advertisement, published in several national
magazines, depicting a robot in women's clothing standing next
to a game board similar to the set of the popular television
show, Wheel of Fortune.4 A caption along with the photograph
read: "Longest-running game show. 2012 A.D." 5
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California granted summary judgment for the defendants on
each of White's claims.6 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and re-
manded.7 The court of appeals affirmed the district court's dis-
missal of White's section 3344 claim.8 The court concluded,
however, that White's common law right of publicity claim could
go to the jury.9 The court reasoned that common law right of
publicity claims in California are not limited to appropriation of
a plaintiff's name or likeness, 10 which had been the most com-
mon methods of appropriation under prior case law," but could
also be brought for appropriation of a plaintiff's identity.12 In
2. White, 971 F.2d at 1396. See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text for
various definitions of the right of publicity.
3. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1994) (prohibiting the nonconsensual
use of a person's name, voice, signature, photograph, likeness, or signature for ad-
vertising purposes). See infra part II.E for a discussion of § 3344.
White also brought a claim under the Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(Supp. V 1993), alleging that the defendants had used a false description or repre-
sentation, creating a likelihood of confusion as to whether White had endorsed
Samsung's product. White, 971 F.2d at 1399-1400. Discussion of the Lanham Act
claim in White is beyond the scope of this Note. For information on the Lanham
Act, see, for example, CHARLES E. McKENNEY & GEORGE F. LONG, III, FEDERAL
UNFAIR COMPETITION: LANHAM ACT SECTION 43(a) (1990).
4. White, 971 F.2d at 1396.
5. Id. See infra part III.A for a discussion of the facts of White.
6. See White, 971 F.2d at 1397-98, 1399.
7. Id. at 1396.
8. Id. at 1397.
9. Id. at 1402. The Ninth Circuit also permitted White's Lanham Act claim to
go to the jury. See id. at 1401. See generally Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a) (Supp. V 1993).
On January 19, 1994, a jury found in favor of White in the amount of
$403,000. The Reliable Source, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1994, at 3.
10. White, 971 F.2d at 1397-98.
11. Id. at 1397 (citing William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 401-02
& nn.156-67 (1960)).
12. Id. at 1398.
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addition, the court of appeals rejected the defendants' parody
defense, 13 reasoning that the parody of Vanna White and Wheel
of Fortune "was subservient and only tangentially related" to
the advertisement's primary commercial purpose. 14 The parody
defense did not apply because it was "better addressed to non-
commercial parodies." 15
The court's decision in White greatly expanded the scope of
the California common law right of publicity,16 creating a cause
of action for the mere evoking of a celebrity's image in the
viewer's mind, rather than requiring a more affirmative, con-
crete appropriation of a celebrity's image, 17 as had been re-
quired under prior case law.' 8 Also, the court's decision did not
provide adequate guidance regarding the relationship between
the First Amendment and the common law right of publicity.19
In addition, by rejecting the defendants' parody defense, the
court created a right of publicity doctrine that conflicts with the
Copyright Act. 20 Indeed, the common law right of publicity
should have a parody defense. 21 Further, as a result of the
White decision, it is possible that copyrights will decrease in
13. Id. at 1401.
14. Id.
15. Id. The nature of the use of the parody, that is, whether it is used for
commercial or non-commercial purposes, is a factor that is taken into account in
the analysis of a parody defense. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 114 S.
Ct. 1164, 1171 (1994); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308-09 (2d Cir. 1992). See
also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See infra part II.F.3 for a background
discussion of the parody defense; see also infra notes 236-45 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the White court's treatment of the defendants' parody
defense.
16. See White, 971 F.2d at 1402 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
17. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir.) (Kozin-
ski, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
18. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); Carson v.
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983); Motschenbacher v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974); Nurmi v. Peterson, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d 1775 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983). See also infra part IV.B for criticisms of the White court's
disposition of the plaintiff's common law right of publicity claim.
19. See infra part IV.C.
20. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See
White, 989 F.2d at 1517-19 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also infra part II.F.2 for a
background discussion of the Copyright Act.
21. See infra part IV.D.
3
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value.22 Finally, Vanna White's claim should have been pre-
empted by the Copyright Act.23
Part II of this Note discusses the background law necessary
for an analysis of the White case. First, the right of publicity is
introduced and defined. Second, the right of privacy, from
which the right of publicity evolved, is discussed. Next, the
right of publicity, including its development in California, is ex-
amined in further detail. The statutory claim for nonconsen-
sual use of a person's name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness under California Civil Code section 3344 is then ex-
amined. In addition, the relationship between the right of pub-
licity and federal law, including the First Amendment and fair
use parody, is discussed.
Part III of this Note discusses the White case, including its
facts, procedural history, holding, and reasoning. The two dis-
senting opinions, the first dissenting from the original holding,
the second from the order rejecting the suggestion for rehearing
en banc, are also discussed. Finally, Part IV of this Note pro-
vides an analysis of the majority and dissenting opinions in the
White case.
II. Background
A. The Right of Publicity Generally
The right of publicity has been defined as "the right to
grant the exclusive privilege of using one's name or likeness for
commercial purposes,"24 the right of a celebrity to protect his or
her "pecuniary interest in the commercial exploitation of his [or
her] identity,"25 "the inherent right of every human being to
22. See infra part IV.E.
23. See infra part IV.F. See also infra notes 163-81 and accompanying text for
a background discussion of federal preemption of state intellectual property law
under the Copyright Act.
This Note also asserts that the dissenting opinion of Judge Kozinski inaccu-
rately analyzed the application of choice of law issues to common law right of pub-
licity claims. See infra part IV.G.
24. NEIL BooRsTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW § 4:11, at 113 (Supp. 1992) (citing Haelan
Lab. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816
(1953)).
25. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir.
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control the commercial use of his or her identity,"26 and "the
right of each person to control and profit from the publicity val-
ues which he [or she] has created or purchased."27 In his article
on popular culture and publicity rights, Professor Michael
Madow states that "[t]he right of publicity essentially gives a
celebrity a legal entitlement to the commercial value of her
identity, thus enabling [the celebrity] to control the extent,
manner, and timing of its commercial exploitation."2s Thus, the
right of publicity focuses on the proprietary and commercial
value of a person's identity.29
The development of the right of publicity has its origins in
the right of privacy.30 In his landmark article, Privacy,31 Wil-
liam Prosser identified four distinct torts included within the
right of privacy: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion; (2)
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; (3) publicity
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and
(4) appropriation of the plaintiff's name or likeness. 32 The right
of publicity evolved from the fourth category of Prosser's privacy
torts-the right of privacy protecting against commercial ap-
propriation, or "appropriation right of privacy."33
Prosser distinguished appropriation right of privacy from
the other three privacy torts, stating that "[t]he interest pro-
tected [by appropriation right of privacy] is not so much a
mental as a proprietary one, in the exclusive use of the plain-
tiff's name and likeness as an aspect of his identity."34 Com-
mentator J. Thomas McCarthy, however, in his treatise on
26. J. THOMAS McCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY vii (1992)
[hereinafter McCARTHY ON PUBLICITY].
27. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
203, 216 (1954), cited in Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Pop-
ular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 130 n.13 (1993).
28. Madow, supra note 27, at 130 n.14.
29. MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 26, § 5.8(A); see also Zacchini, 433
U.S. at 576 (stating that "[tihe rationale for (protecting the right of publicity) is to
prevent unjust enrichment by the theft of good will") (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr.,
Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 326, 331 (1966)).
30. MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 26, § 1.1(A), (B)(2).
31. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
32. Id. at 389. This fourth category of Prosser's privacy torts will be referred
to either as appropriation right of privacy or commercial appropriation.
33. See MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 26, § 1.5(D).
34. Prosser, supra note 31, at 406.
5
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publicity and privacy, states that the appropriation right of pri-
vacy and the right of publicity have developed into separate and
distinct bodies of law. 35 The appropriation right of privacy pro-
tects against an unpermitted use of personal identity that
would cause injury to self-esteem and dignity. 36 In contrast, the
right of publicity protects the proprietary and commercial value
of a person's identity and persona.37 Courts and other commen-
tators have, similar to McCarthy, distinguished between the
right of publicity and the appropriation right of privacy.38
Other courts, however, appear to have blurred or confused this
distinction.39 For purposes of this Note, the appropriation right
of privacy and the right of publicity will be treated as separate
and distinct theories.
B. Roots of the Right of Privacy
The right of privacy has its origins in the landmark article
by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Pri-
vacy.40 There, the authors opined that the growing excesses of
the press had made it necessary for the law to protect the pri-
35. McCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 26, § 5.8(C).
36. Id. § 5.8(A).
37. Id. § 5.8(C). McCarthy states that the basic difference between appropria-
tion right of privacy and the right of publicity is not based "upon the type of activ-
ity by the defendant but on the nature of the plaintiff's right and the nature of the
resulting injury." Id. The appropriation right of privacy is violated by an injury to
the psyche; the right of publicity is violated by an injury to the pocketbook. Id.
38. See, e.g., Howard I. Berkman, Comment, Right of Publicity, 42 BROOK. L.
REV. 527, 532-33 (1976); Haelan Lab. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).
39. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir.
1983). In Carson, the court referred to the fourth of Prosser's privacy torts, appro-
priation right of privacy, as the right of publicity, stating that appropriation right
of privacy "has become known as the right of publicity." Id. at 834 (quoting Factors
Etc. v. Pro Arts, 579 F.2d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979)).
While the Carson court appeared to recognize that the appropriation right of pri-
vacy provides redress for embarrassment and mental damages which flow from
appropriation of one's identity without consent, and that the right of publicity pro-
tects against the unauthorized exploitation of a celebrity's identity, its use of the
terminology, "right of publicity," as the fourth of Prosser's privacy torts is confus-
ing. See id. at 834.
40. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REV. 193 (1890). See Nimmer, supra note 27, at 203-04; Eastwood v. Superior
Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
166
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vate individual from the mental pain and distress resulting
from the intrusion by the press into people's private affairs. 41
Many of the earliest cases to arise under this emerging
body of privacy law were not those brought by celebrity-plain-
tiffs, but by private individuals whose names or likenesses had
been used in advertisements. One of the earliest and most well-
known cases in the United States to recognize the common law
right of privacy was Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance
Co. 42 The Pavesich court explicitly accepted the premise of the
Warren and Brandeis article, finding that the right of privacy
was necessitated by both natural law and analogy to previous
cases.43 This type of unauthorized use of a plaintiff's name and
41. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 40, at 196. See also W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 849 & n.7, 850-51 (5th
ed. 1984).
42. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). See Prosser, supra note 31, at 384-86.
In Pavesich, the plaintiff complained that the defendant's unauthorized use of
his photograph in its testimonial advertisement exposed him to ridicule. 50 S.E. at
69. The Georgia Supreme Court held this to be an actionable invasion of privacy.
Id. at 80-81.
Statutory recognition of the right of privacy came prior to Pavesich, in 1903,
when the New York Legislature enacted a statute which provided civil and crimi-
nal remedies for the unauthorized use of "the name, portrait or picture of any liv-
ing person... for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade .... ." Act of
Apr. 6, 1903, ch. 132, §§ 1-2, 1903 N.Y. Laws 308 (codified as amended at N.Y. Crv.
RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992)). The New York statute was enacted fol-
lowing the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). In Roberson, the plaintiff
claimed that the defendant's unauthorized use of her picture in its advertisements
caused her great distress, suffering, and humiliation, with both mental and physi-
cal manifestations. Id. at 542-43, 64 N.E. at 442. The court denied recovery, find-
ing no precedent in the case law for Warren & Brandeis' "so-called right of
privacy." Id. at 544, 547, 64 N.E. at 443, 444. The court suggested, however, that
the legislature could intervene and "provide that no one should be permitted for
his own selfish purpose to use the picture or the name of another for advertising
purposes without his consent." Id. at 545, 64 N.E. at 443. One year later, the New
York Legislature followed the court's suggestion and enacted the statute. See
Prosser, supra note 31, at 385. Roberson has never been overruled, and New York
right of privacy law is limited to the scope of this statute; there is no common law
right of privacy in New York. See Stephano v. News Group Publications, 64 N.Y.2d
174, 182, 474 N.E.2d 580, 583, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220, 223 (1984).
43. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 70, 74-77 (citing Schulyer v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 436, 42
N.E. 22 (1895); Murray v. Gast Lithographic & Engraving Co., 8 Misc. 36, 28
N.Y.S. 271 (N.Y.C. C.P. Equity T. N.Y. County), aff'd, Murray v. Babitt, 10 Misc.
365, 31 N.Y.S. 17 (N.Y.C. C.P. Gen. T. N.Y. County 1894); Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc.
290, 26 N.Y.S. 908 (N.Y.C. Super. Ct. Spec. T. N.Y. County 1893); Schulyer v. Cur-
tis, 15 N.Y.S. 787 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1892); Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral
7
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:161
likeness, privacy right appropriation,44 became a widely recog-
nized aspect of the right of privacy in the ensuing years.45
The common law right of privacy has long been recognized
in California." In California, a plaintiff may assert a common
law claim for appropriation of his or her name or likeness by
alleging: (1) the defendant's use of his or her identity; (2) the
appropriation of his or her name or likeness to defendant's ad-
vantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) the lack of consent; and
(4) resulting injury.47
The earliest California case involving the right of privacy
was Melvin v. Reid.48 Melvin involved what would most likely
fall under the "public disclosure of private fact" branch of pri-
Springs, 18 N.Y.S. 240 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. N.Y. County 1891); Pollard v. Photo-
graphic Co., 40 Ch. Div. 345 (1888); Tuck & Sons v. Priester, 19 Q.B.D. 629 (1887);
Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De G. & Sm. 652, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1849); Abernethy v.
Hutchinson, 1 H. & Tw. 28, 47 Eng. Rep. 1313 (1825); Yovatt v. Wingard, 1 Jac. &
W. 394, 37 Eng. Rep. 425 (1820); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 40, at 193, 202,
207-08, 212).
44. See supra text accompanying notes 32, 36.
45. Madow, supra note 27, at 168 & n.205 (citing Flake v. Greensboro News,
195 S.E. 55, 63-64 (N.C. 1938) (unauthorized use of likeness); Kunz v. Allen, 172 P.
532 (Kan. 1918) (unauthorized use of likeness); Foster-Molburn Co. v. Chinn, 120
S.W. 364 (Ky. 1909) (unauthorized use of name and likeness)).
46. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)
(citing Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931)).
In California, appropriation right of privacy is similar to the law in other juris-
dictions discussed previously, see supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text, in
that it is essentially a tort claim, Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
498 F.2d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 1974), involving "a direct wrong of a personal character
resulting in injury to the feelings, without regard to any effect which the publica-
tion may have on the property, business, pecuniary interest, or the standing of the
individual in the community." Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 291
P.2d 194, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955).
47. Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347. Note that the Eastwood court discussed
these four elements under the rubric of Prosser's fourth branch of privacy tort,
commercial appropriation, and in the same discussion stated that these elements
state a cause of action for violation of the right of publicity. See id. at 346-49. The
White court stated that these four elements state a "common law right of publicity
[claim]." White, 971 F.2d at 1397 (citing Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 342).
As stated previously, this author maintains a conceptual distinction between
Prosser's fourth privacy tort, appropriation right of privacy, and the right of pub-
licity, since the appropriation right of privacy protects the unpermitted use of one's
personal identity which causes injury to self-esteem and dignity, and the right of
publicity protects the proprietary and commercial value of a person's identity and
persona. See McCARTHY ON PUBLIcrrY, supra note 26, § 5.8(A), (C). See also supra
notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
48. 297 P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931).
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vacy law.49 The court permitted recovery based on a clause in
the California Constitution: the right "to pursue and obtain
happiness."50
One of the earliest California cases to allow recovery under
the appropriation right of privacy was Kerby v. Hal Roach Stu-
dios.51 In Kerby, the plaintiff was an actress and singer whose
name was used in letters that the defendant had mailed to male
householders to promote the defendant's motion picture, in
which the plaintiff did not appear.52 The court noted that the
right of privacy had been recognized eleven years earlier in Mel-
vin v. Reid.53 The court in Kerby stated that although the facts
were quite different from those in Melvin, the court would allow
recovery because the letter imputed to the plaintiff "a laxness of
character [and] a coarseness of moral fibre .. .; and to spread
such imputations... is as much an invasion of the right of pri-
vacy as was the publication of true but derogatory statements
in Melvin v. Reid."54
Another noted California case is Fairfield v. American Pho-
tocopy Equipment Co. 55 In Fairfield, the court held that the
plaintiff's right of privacy had been invaded since, without
plaintiff's consent, the defendant had advertised in a national
lawyers' publication that the plaintiff was a satisfied user of the
defendant's photocopying equipment. 56
49. See Prosser, supra note 31, at 392. See also supra text accompanying
notes 31-32. Melvin involved the depiction of the past life of the plaintiff, a prosti-
tute who had been tried and acquitted for murder and had, in the eight years since,
remarried and been living a "virtuous, honorable and righteous life." Melvin, 297
P. at 91.
50. Melvin, 297 P. at 93 ("All men are by nature free and independent, and
have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enijoying and defending
life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; and pursuing and
obtaining safety and happiness.") (quoting CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 1). The
Melvin court stated that whether this invasion of the plaintiff's "inalienable right"
was termed the right of privacy or "any other name" was "immaterial" since it was
guaranteed by the state's constitution. Melvin, 297 P. at 93-94.
51. 127 P.2d 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942).
52. Id. at 578-79.
53. Id. at 579 (citing Melvin, 297 P. at 92).
54. Kerby, 127 P.2d at 581.
55. 291 P.2d 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955).
56. Id. at 197. In Fairfield, the court stated that the right of privacy included
the right of a person to be free from unauthorized and unwarranted publicity, id.
(citing Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967, 970 (Ky. 1927)), and that "an unauthorized
use or publication of a person's name may constitute an actionable invasion of
9
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:161
C. Roots of the Right of Publicity
Confusion developed when celebrity-plaintiffs appeared in
court claiming that their names or likenesses had been used for
advertising purposes without their consent.57 This confusion
stemmed from the fact that the claim was for violating the right
of privacy, which was based on the tort law concept of "personal
injury to dignity and state of mind, measured by mental dis-
tress damages."58 When a well-known public figure claimed to
have suffered this type of harm, the courts were hesitant to ap-
ply the privacy concept to a "public" person and found it difficult
to understand how such a person could suffer mental anguish
from appearing in an advertisement. 59 Since celebrities had as-
sumed positions of prominence and visibility, many courts held
that they had waived their rights of privacy as to news commen-
taries and commercial advertisements. 6o In other courts, the
rule was that a publicity claim was only actionable if "offen-
sive," which had the effect of barring most actions involving
commercial appropriations of celebrity likenesses.61 Moreover,
even where courts allowed recovery for damages for invasion of
privacy, such damages were limited to "hurt feelings," and the
[that] right." Id. (citing Kerby, 127 P.2d at 580-81). The court reasoned that the
defendant's conduct fell within "the narrowest definition of the right of privacy,"
since it constituted an unauthorized and unwarranted appropriation of plaintiff's
personality as a lawyer for pecuniary gain and profit. Id. at 197-98. The court
found that the defendant knew at the time it published the advertisement that the
representation was false. Id. at 197. The court further held that neither inadver-
tence nor mistake was a defense to an invasion of the plaintiff's right of privacy.
Id.
57. See Madow, supra note 27, at 169; see also Berkman, supra note 38, at
529-30.
58. MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 26, § 1.6. See also supra text accom-
panying note 36.
59. Id.
60. See Madow, supra note 27, at 169 & n.210 (citing O'Brien v. Pabst Sales
Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941); Paramount Pictures v. Leader Press, 24 F. Supp.
1004 (W.D. Okla. 1938), rev'd on other grounds, 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939);
Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 10 Ohio Op. 338 (Ohio C.P. 1938)).
In O'Brien, the plaintiff was a professional football player whose photograph
was used by a beer company in an advertisement calendar. 124 F.2d at 168. The
photograph was obtained from the publicity department at O'Brien's former uni-
versity, where he had risen to national acclaim as a football player. Id. at 169.
The court denied his right of privacy claim, reasoning that "the publicity he got
was only that which he had been constantly seeking and receiving...." Id. at 170.
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damage awards were small or nominal. 62 The courts were not
only unreceptive to celebrity claims for commercial appropria-
tions of their images, but the right of privacy theory was a "less
than perfect vehicle for celebrities eager to extract the maxi-
mum possible benefit from their publicity values."6 3
The earliest case explicitly recognizing the right of publicity
was Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum.6 4 In Haelan,
the court held that in addition to, and independent of, the statu-
tory right of privacy in New York, 65 "a man has a right in the
62. Id. at 169 & n.212 (citing Miller v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 176
Misc. 714, 717, 28 N.Y.S.2d 811, 813-14 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1941) (holding that
a well-known performer, who acknowledged that his photo on the cover of an offi-
cial program had not caused him any humiliation, was entitled to six cents in dam-
ages); Fisher v. Murry M. Rosenberg, Inc., 175 Misc. 370, 371, 23 N.Y.S.2d 677,
679 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1940) (finding that use of a famous dancer's photograph
in a shoe advertisement entitled the plaintiff to $300 for "injured feelings")).
63. Madow, supra note 27, at 169-70. See also infra notes 71-77 and accompa-
nying text.
64. 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). See Berk-
man, supra note 38, at 534.
In Haelan, the plaintiff chewing-gum company had contracted with a famous
baseball player to put the player's image on baseball cards, and the player agreed
not to give this right to another gum manufacturer during the contract period.
Haelan, 202 F.2d at 867. The defendant was a competitor of the plaintiff, and the
defendant, knowing of the plaintiff's contract, induced the baseball player to allow
the defendant to also use his photograph on defendant's baseball cards. Id. The
plaintiff brought suit under New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50-51. Id. See infra
note 65 for a discussion of §§ 50-51. The defendant in Haelan argued that the
right of privacy under New York law was personal, non-assignable, and covered
only the right to not have one's feelings hurt by unauthorized publication of his
likeness or name. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 867. Thus, the argument went, there was
no "property" in the right or permission that the plaintiff had obtained from the
player, and the defendant had not invaded any legal interest when it induced the
player to breach his contract with the plaintiff. Id. The defendant further con-
tended that the plaintiff's contracts created no more than a release from liability
for invasion of the right of privacy. Id. at 868.
65. The appropriation right of privacy in New York is governed by statute.
See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992). Section 50 provides in rele-
vant part: "A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for
the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without
having first obtained the written consent of such person .... is guilty of a misde-
meanor." Id. § 50. Section 51 provides for a civil action for damages and an injunc-
tion in the case of such conduct. Id. § 51.
Haelan was decided by a federal court interpreting New York law. New York
courts, however, have refused to find a common law right of privacy or publicity,
restricting recovery to that permitted under §§ 50-51. See Arrington v. New York
Times, 55 N.Y.2d 433, 440, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1321, 449 N.Y.S.2d 941, 943 (1982)
(stating that in New York, "there exists no so-called common-law right to privacy")
11
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publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the ex-
clusive privilege of publishing his picture.. . ."66 The court did
not decide whether such a right was, in fact, "property," reason-
ing that the question was "immaterial," since the label, "prop-
erty," "simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim
which has pecuniary worth."67 Since Haelan, "[clourts and com-
mentators [have] come to regard [the right of publicity] as a
full-blooded property right."68
In 1954, Melville B. Nimmer wrote the landmark article,
The Right of Publicity.69 One commentator has said that this
article "did for the right of publicity what Warren and Brandeis
did . . . for the right of privacy."70 Nimmer asserted that the
right of privacy and other traditional areas of the law were in-
adequate to protect a person's commercial interest in his or her
identity.7 1
First, Nimmer reasoned that when a celebrity sought re-
dress for the unauthorized use of his or her name or portrait
under the right of privacy theory, most courts found that the
celebrity had "waived" his or her right of privacy because cer-
tain aspects of the celebrity's life had become public.7 2
Second, Nimmer concluded that recovery under the right of
privacy required conduct that was "offensive to persons of ordi-
(quoting Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493, 497 n.2, 382 N.E.2d 1145, 1146
n.2, 410 N.Y.S.2d 282, 284 n.2 (1978)); see also Stephano v. News Group Publica-
tions, 64 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 474 N.E.2d 580, 584, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 (1984) (stat-
ing that "the right of publicity' is encompassed under the Civil Rights Law [§§ 50-
51] as an aspect of the right of privacy. .
66. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868.
67. Id.
68. Madow, supra note 27, at 130 n.14 (citing Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d
1205, 1206 (8th Cir. 1969); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1355 (D.
N.J. 1981); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970);
STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 52-53 (1990)).
Given this status as a property right, the right of publicity is transferable by
license or assignment and in some states is descendible. Madow, supra note 27, at
130 (citing MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 26, §§ 10.3-10.4).
69. Nimmer, supra note 27.
70. MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 26, § 1.8 n.1 (citing Steven J. Hoff-
man, Limitations on the Right of Publicity, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 111 (1980)).
See supra text accompanying notes 40-41 for a discussion of Samuel D. Warren &
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
71. Nimmer, supra note 27, at 204.
72. Id. at 204-05. See also supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
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nary sensibilities" or was "beyond the limits of decency."7 3 In
most cases a prominent celebrity could not honestly claim that
the use of his or her name, photograph, or likeness was humili-
ating, offensive, or embarrassing since what the celebrity really
sought was payment for the use of his or her publicity value,
and it would be difficult to allege that nonpayment would offend
the sensibilities of an ordinary person.74
Third, Nimmer stated that the right of privacy was per-
sonal and nonassignable.7 5 Thus, when a celebrity granted per-
mission to another to use his or her name or likeness, it was
simply a release from liability for invasion of the right of pri-
vacy.76 The grantee could not prevent a third party from in-
fringing on his or her right to use the celebrity's name or
likeness. 77
Fourth, Nimmer reasoned that other legal theories, such as
unfair competition,78 breach of contract, or defamation were
also inadequate to protect the celebrity's publicity value. 79 Un-
fair competition requires competition which is not always pres-
ent when a person's publicity rights are violated.80 Recovery
under a contract theory is limited to parties to such contracts,
yet a person whose right of publicity is violated may not be a
party to any contract.8' A defamation theory may be inade-
quate since such a claim requires that the defendant's conduct
73. Id. at 207 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 cmt. d (1939)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 209.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Unfair competition is broadly defined as "misappropriation for commercial
advantage of a benefit or property right belonging to another." BLACK'S LAw Dic-
TIONARY 1529 (6th ed. 1990). Recovery for unfair competition generally requires
competition between the plaintiff and the defendant, and in many courts, the
"'palming off' of the goods or business of one person as that of another." Nimmer,
supra note 27, at 210, 212, 213 (quoting American Broadcasting Co. v. Wahl Co.,
36 F. Supp. 167, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1940)).
79. Nimmer, supra note 27, at 210, 214-15.
80. Id. Nimmer asserted that the right of publicity "should exist ... regard-
less of whether the defendant is in competition with the plaintiff, and regardless of
whether he is passing off his own products as those of the plaintiff." Id. at 216.
81. Id. at 214.
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be offensive or disparaging.8 2 However, a person's right of pub-
licity may be violated even without such disparaging conduct.8 3
Finally, Nimmer asserted that the right of publicity would
compensate for the inadequacy of these existing legal theories
and thereby protect a celebrity's publicity value in his or her
name or likeness.84 He suggested that the right of publicity
should be "recognized as a property... right [and thus be] capa-
ble of assignment and subsequent enforcement by the as-
signee."85 He also proposed that recovery should be allowed
"regardless of whether the defendant has used the publicity in a
manner offensive to the sensibilities of the plaintiff."86 In addi-
tion, he suggested that damages should be measured not in
terms of the injury sustained by the plaintiff, as in the right of
privacy, but by the "value of the publicity appropriated by [the]
defendant ...."87
D. The Right of Publicity in California
Long after the federal district court in Haelan8 8 had as-
sumed the existence of a right of publicity in New York, Califor-
nia courts were still hostile to this emerging theory. 89 By 1974,
82. Id. at 215.
83. Id.




88. Haelan Lab. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). See also
supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of Haelan.
89. In Strickler v. National Broadcasting Co., 167 F. Supp. 68 (C.D. Cal.
1958), Melville B. Nimmer, arguing for the plaintiff, was unable to convince the
United States District Court for the Central District of California to adopt a right
of publicity cause of action under California law. Id. at 69-70. Nimmer was the
author of the noted article, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS.
203 (1954), see supra notes 69-87 and accompanying text, and co-author of the
noted treatise MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
(1991).
However, several years later, a California court took a step towards finding a
right of publicity in California, in In re Weingand, 41 Cal. Rptr. 778 (Cal. Ct. App.
1964). In Weingand, the estate of actor Peter Lorre successfully objected to an
aspiring actor's request to change his name to Peter Lorie. Id. at 781. In denying
the petitioner's application, the court stated that the confusion created by the peti-
tioner in using the name would "directly affect the commercial and professional
value of the services and performances of Peter Lorre both present and future,"
since Peter Lorre's name was "unique in the entertainment industry in that it con-
note[d] the unique characterization, style, manner of speaking and appearance of
174 [Vol. 15:161
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however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, in Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,90 had al-
lowed recovery under the theory that the plaintiff had a
proprietary interest in his identity.91 In Motschenbacher, the
plaintiff was a popular race car driver, and the defendants used
a photograph of the plaintiff's distinctive and widely recognized
race car in its cigarette advertisement.92 In the advertisement,
the defendants changed the number of the plaintiff's car, at-
tached a spoiler to the car, and removed advertisements for
other products that were on the car.93 The defendants also ad-
ded several comic-strip-type balloons to the advertisement,
which contained advertising messages.94 Although the plaintiff
was not identifiable in the advertisement, he was, in fact, the
driver. 95 Some viewers "who had seen the commercial ... im-
mediately recognized plaintiff's car and ... inferred that it was
sponsored by [the defendants]." 96
The court in Motschenbacher began its analysis by recog-
nizing that the plaintiff's claim was of the fourth variety of
Prosser's privacy torts: commercial appropriation.97 The court
then stated that while the right of privacy was a right of a per-
sonal nature which protected injury to one's feelings, this fact
applied more to Prosser's first three categories of the right of
privacy98 than it did to commercial appropriation.99 Although
the appropriation of one's name and likeness could cause harm
that was mental and subjective, the court observed, when the
identity appropriated has a commercial value, "the injury may
be largely, or even wholly, of an economic or material nature."10 0
[Peter] Lorre." Id. at 782. Although the court made no mention of a right of pri-
vacy or publicity, its language suggested that a commercial value existed in Lorre's
name and that the petitioner's use of Lorre's name would bring economic harm to
the estate of Peter Lorre. See id.
90. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
91. Id. at 825.
92. Id. at 822.
93. Id.




97. Id. at 824. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
98. See supra text accompanying note 32.




The court noted that some courts had protected this commercial
aspect of an individual's interest in his own identity under a
privacy theory, while others had done so "under the rubric of
'property' or a so-called 'right of publicity.' "101 The court cited
Prosser's treatise on torts10 2 for the proposition that it is point-
less to dispute whether such a right should be classified as prop-
erty, that "it is at least clearly proprietary in its nature, and
that [o]nce protected by the law, it is a right of value upon
which the plaintiff can capitalize by selling licenses." 10 3 The
court concluded that California courts would afford legal protec-
tion to an individual's proprietary interest in his own identity,
but it did not need to decide "whether they would do so under
the rubric of privacy, property, or publicity."10 4 The court said
only that California courts would, indeed, "recognize such an in-
terest and protect it."106
Four years later, in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,10 6 the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court explicitly recognized the right of public-
ity.07 Although the case primarily concerned the post-mortem
aspects of the appropriation of one's name and likeness, the
case is significant for its statement describing the right of
publicity:
The so-called right of publicity means in essence that the reaction
of the public to name and likeness, which may be fortuitous or
which may be managed or planned, endows the name and like-
ness of the person involved with commercially exploitable oppor-
101. Id. For a discussion of the privacy theory, see, for example, Palmer v.
Schonhorn Enters., 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967); James M. Treece,
Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories, 51 TEX. L.
REV. 637 (1973); Victor S. Netterville, Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody, Mim-
icry and Humorous Commentary, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 225, 253-54, 267-75 (1962),
cited in Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 825.
For a discussion of the publicity theory, see, for example, Ettore v. Philco Tele-
vision Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485-93 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
926 (1956); Haelan Lab. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1280-83
(D. Minn. 1983), cited in Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 825.
102. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (4th
ed. 1971).
103. 498 F.2d at 825 (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 102, § 117, at 807).
104. Id. at 825-26.
105. Id. at 826.
106. 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979).
107. Id. at 431.
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tunities. The protection of name and likeness from unwarranted
intrusion or exploitation is the heart of the law of privacy.'08
Another important case construing California right of pub-
licity law was Midler v. Ford Motor Co.1o9 In Midler, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the defendants, an
advertising agency and its client, had appropriated part of en-
tertainer Bette Midler's identity by using a "sound-alike" singer
to imitate her voice in a commercial and had thereby committed
a tort under California common law. 110 The court quoted Mot-
schenbacher for the proposition that California "recognize[s] an
injury from 'an appropriation of the attributes of one's iden-
tity.' "" The Midler court reasoned that just as a person's face
is distinctive, so is a person's voice, especially that of a re-
nowned singer. 1 2 The court stated, "to impersonate her voice is
to pirate her identity."113 Consequently, after Midler, the com-
mon law right of publicity in California can be violated by ap-
propriating the attributes of a celebrity's distinctive voice.
114
In Nurmi v. Peterson,115 an actress who created the charac-
ter, "Vampira," a 1950's television movie hostess, sued an ac-
tress who portrayed a horror movie hostess called "Elvira" for
appropriation of the plaintiff's likeness as the "Vampira" char-
acter.116 The plaintiff's causes of action were, inter alia, for the
violation of her common law right of privacy and publicity, and
for the violation of California Civil Code section 3344.117
108. Id.
109. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
110. Id. at 461, 463.
111. Id. at 463 (quoting Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 824).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 26, § 4.14(B). Another Ninth
Circuit voice appropriation case was Waits v. Frito Lay, 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.
1992). In Waits, noted jazz/blues singer Tom Waits sued Frito Lay and its adver-
tising agency for, inter alia, voice misappropriation, which the court stated was "a
species of... the 'right of publicity.'" Id. at 1098. The defendants had used a
"sound-alike" singer to imitate Waits' highly distinctive voice in a radio commer-
cial. Id. The court found in favor of Waits, reasoning that "when voice is a suffi-
cient indicia of a celebrity's identity, the right of publicity protects against its
imitation for commercial purposes without the celebrity's consent." Id. (citing
Midler, 849 F.2d at 463).
115. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1775 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
116. Id. at 1776-77.
117. Id. at 1776. See infra part II.E for a discussion of CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344.
17
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The court noted that the plaintiff had not alleged that the
defendant's character exactly duplicated the plaintiff's charac-
ter, but only that the defendant had used "certain props, clothes
or mannerisms that were similar to [plaintiff's character]."" l8
The defendants argued that "the use of another character's gen-
eral characteristics, as opposed to specific facial features, photo-
graphs or other exact physical replicas, was not actionable
under section 3344 or the common law rights of publicity or
privacy."119
First, in construing the term "likeness" in section 3344, the
court held that the California Supreme Court had employed the
word to mean "an exact copy of another's features and not
merely a suggestive resemblance." 120 Since the plaintiff had
not alleged that the defendant's character "exactly duplicated"
the physical qualities of the plaintiff's character, the plaintiff's
section 3344 claim failed.121 The court also reasoned that if, as
the plaintiffs contended, the use of a person's general character-
istics (as opposed to specific features, photographs or replicas)
amounted to an appropriation of that person's likeness, the first
person to portray a character or part would "freeze all rights to
certain props, clothing, or other qualities surrounding a charac-
ter."122 The court noted that under this theory, "all subsequent
actors would be subject to legal challenge on the grounds that
they had copied elements of characters portrayed by earlier gen-
erations of actors."123 The court asserted that "the result [of em-
ploying the plaintiff's theory] would greatly inhibit the
development of the entertainment arts and the freedom of ex-
pression."124 The court stated that the California Legislature
could not have intended such a result when it drafted section
3344.125
118. Nurmi, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1777. The plaintiff's character consisted of "a
distinctive dark dress, certain horror movie props, and a special personality." Id.
at 1776.
119. Id. at 1777.
120. Id. (interpreting Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 427, 431
(Cal. 1979)).
121. Id. at 1778.
122. Id. at 1777-78.
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Second, under the plaintiff's common law right of privacy
and publicity claims, the court similarly held that because the
plaintiff's allegations did "not amount to a claim that the plain-
tiff's actual features were used by the defendants for commer-
cial purposes, no common law right of publicity or privacy
action could be maintained."1 26 The court distinguished Midler
v. Ford Motor Co.,127 and Chaplin v. Amador,12s cited by the
plaintiff, stating that in both of these cases the plaintiffs' claims
were permitted to go forward only on fraud grounds and "not on
right of privacy or publicity grounds." 29 The court reasoned
that in Midler, the defendants had deceived the public into be-
lieving that Bette Midler was singing in the commercial by us-
ing a "sound-alike" singer; 30 in Chaplin, the defendant, a
Charlie Chaplin imitator, had attempted by fraudulent means
to deceive the public into believing his film was a Charlie Chap-
lin film.' 3 ' The court concluded that neither of these two cases
supported the proposition that a right of publicity claim could
be brought for "a person's use of a character that bears a mere
resemblance to another ....- 132
E. California Civil Code Section 3344
Section 3344(a) of the California Civil Code 133 provides a
cause of action for damages where any person "knowingly uses
another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in
any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for
purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of,
products, merchandise, goods or services, without such person's
prior consent . . 34
126. Id.
127. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). See also supra text accompanying notes
109-14.
128. 269 P. 544 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928).
129. Nurmi, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1778 (construing Midler, 849 F.2d at 463-64;
Chaplin, 269 P. at 545-46).
130. Id. (citing Midler, 849 F.2d at 463-64).
131. Id. at 1778 (citing Chaplin, 269 P. at 545-46).
132. Id.
133. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344(a) (West Supp. 1994).
134. Id. The statute was enacted in 1971 and, at the time, covered only com-
mercial appropriations of name, photograph, and likeness. Act of Nov. 22, 1971,
ch. 1595, 1971 Cal. Laws 3426. In 1984 it was amended to include commercial
19
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:161
To plead a cause of action under section 3344, the plaintiff
must allege a knowing use of the plaintiff's name, photograph,
voice, signature or likeness, 135 a direct connection between the
use and the commercial purpose, 136 and satisfy the four common
law elements previously mentioned. 37 Thus, the difference be-
tween common law and statutory right of privacy claims is that
mistake and inadvertence are not defenses to common law com-
mercial appropriation, but are valid defenses against statutory
commercial appropriation. 3 8
Subsection (d) of California Civil Code section 3344 ex-
empts from liability the use of a name, voice, signature, photo-
graph, or likeness "in connection with any news, pubic affairs,
or sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign...."13 9
Subsection (e) of the statute provides that consent is not re-
quired for the use of a person's name, voice, signature, photo-
graph, or likeness "solely because the material containing such
appropriations of voice and signature. Act of Sept. 30, 1984, ch. 1704, § 2, 1984
Cal. Laws 6172.
The case of Stilson v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 104 Cal. Rptr. 581 (Cal. Ct. App.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 952 (1973), is stated to be the genesis of the California
right of privacy statute. McCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 26, § 6.4(E)(1) (citing
Jerome E. Weinstein, Commercial Appropriations of Name or Likeness: Section
3344 and the Common Law, 52 L.A. B.J. 430, 432 (1977)). Stilson was a class
action lawsuit in which the plaintiffs alleged that their names had been used with-
out their consent in computer-generated solicitations received from Reader's Di-
gest. Stilson, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 582. Each letter'stated that the addressee and his
neighbors had been selected to participate in a contest and listed each recipient's
name as a neighbor of the other recipients. Id. The court stated that such a class
action on behalf of over 20 million persons would be an "intolerable burden" on the
judicial system, since each plaintiff would have to prove his or her state of mind
and mental suffering. Id. at 583. As a result of these types of damage proof
problems for non-celebrity plaintiffs, the statute includes a minimum recovery
amount of $750 per plaintiff. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a). See also McCARTHY ON
PUBLICITY, supra note 26, § 6.4(E)(1).
135. Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347 (citing Weinstein, supra note 134, at
430-33).
136. Id. (citing Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr.
370, 381 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)).
137. The four common law elements are: (1) the defendant's use of the plain-
tiff's identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness to defendant's
advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury.
Id.
138. Id. at 346 n.6 (citing Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Corp., 291
P.2d 194, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955)).
139. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344(d).
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use is commercially sponsored or contains paid advertising."140
The statute makes it a question of fact whether the use "was so
directly connected with the commercial sponsorship or with the
paid advertising as to constitute a use for which consent is re-
quired . "141 In addition, the statute provides that its reme-
dies "are cumulative and in addition to any provided for by
law."'14
2
F. Federal Law and the Right of Publicity
1. The First Amendment and the Right of Publicity
The scope of the right of publicity can be limited by First
Amendment considerations of freedom of speech and press. 43
The First Amendment is often asserted as a defense in right of
publicity cases.'" In such cases the court must determine
whether the First Amendment will preclude the plaintiff's
claim.145
140. Id. § 3344(e).
141. Id.
142. Id. § 3344(g). This language suggests that claims beyond the scope of
§ 3344 are possible. See McCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 26, § 6.4(F)(8); Wein-
stein, supra note 134, at 432-33, 454-56.
California right of privacy law exists in both common law and statutory formu-
lations. See Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) (citing Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 428 n.6 (Cal. 1979) (stat-
ing that the common law right of privacy, termed "appropriation" by Prosser, was
.complemented legislatively" by California's appropriation statute)). In contrast,
the right of privacy in New York exists only under statute. See supra notes 42, 65
for discussions of right of privacy law in New York.
143. 2 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPE-
TrriON § 28.05 (1992) [hereinafter McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS].
144. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563
(1977); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g
denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993); Guglielmi v.
Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 458 (Cal. 1979) (en banc) (Bird, C.J., con-
curring); Maheu v. CBS, 247 Cal. Rptr. 304, 312 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Eastwood v.
Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
145. See Berkman, supra note 38, at 550. Berkman asserts that "the right of
publicity is not a restriction on freedom of speech because material that is the
object of the right's protection is thoroughly commercial, beyond the reach of the
First Amendment." Id. at 549. However, the Supreme Court case of Central Hud-
son Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,561-63 (1980), decided after
Berkman's article was written, makes it clear that purely commercial speech does
receive First Amendment protection, albeit less protection than other forms of




In Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions,146 then-
Chief Justice Bird of the California Supreme Court stated in
her concurring opinion that "an action for infringement of the
right of publicity can be maintained only if the proprietary in-
terests at issue clearly outweigh the value of free expression in
this context."1 47 Chief Justice Bird examined the decisions of
other courts that had considered this question and found that
the right of publicity had not been allowed to outweigh the
value of free expression, regardless of whether the context was
factual and biographical, or fictional. 148 She reasoned that in
the absence of such a rule, reports and commentaries on the
thoughts and conduct of public and prominent persons would be
subject to censorship under the guise of preventing the dissipa-
tion of the publicity value of a person's identity.
49
Commentator J. Thomas McCarthy has stated that when a
court is presented with a First Amendment defense it must un-
dertake "an informed balancing of rights"; he characterized this
analysis as highly fact-specific. 50 McCarthy has also stated
that "a given unauthorized use of a person's identity will fall
within one of two categories: . . . 'communicative' or 'commer-
cial.' "-9' Indeed, many of the right of publicity cases involving
146. 603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979) (en banc).
147. Id. at 461 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
148. Id. at 461-62 nn.17-18 (Bird, C.J., concurring) (citing Hicks v. Casa-
blanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Factors Etc. v. Creative
Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc.,
4 Media L. Rep. 2307, 2307-08 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. N.Y. County 1979), aff'd, 75
A.D.2d 768, 427 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1st Dep't 1980); Rosemont Enters. v. McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 85 Misc. 2d 583, 587-88, 380 N.Y.S.2d 839, 844 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. N.Y.
County 1975); Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, 58 Misc. 2d 1, 6, 294 N.Y.S.2d
122, 129 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. N.Y. County 1968), aff'd, 32 A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d
948 (1st Dep't 1969); Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 272 P.2d
177, 183 (Utah 1954)).
149. Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 462 (Bird, C.J., concurring). In addition, a Cali-
fornia appeals court has stated that the right of publicity "invokes constitutional
[First Amendment] protections." Maheu v. CBS, 247 Cal. Rptr. 304, 312 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988).
150. 2 McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 143, § 28.05.
151. Id. McCarthy states that speech is "communicative... where the policy
of free speech predominates over the right of a person to his identity, and no in-
fringement of the right of publicity takes place." Id. Speech is "commercial...
where the right of publicity is infringed because, while there are overtones of ideas
being communicated, the use is primarily commercial." Id.
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First Amendment concerns consider the category of the speech
in their analyses. 152
Statutes governing commercial appropriation also use a
categorical approach in determining which types of speech will
be exempted from proscription. California Civil Code section
3344, which prohibits the unauthorized use of a person's name,
voice, signature, photograph, or likeness for advertising pur-
poses, provides an exception for uses in connection with news,
public affairs, sports broadcasts or accounts, or political cam-
paigns.153 These uses, exempted from section 3344, have been
extended to California common law appropriation claims. 54
The purpose of these exceptions is to "avoid First Amendment
questions in the area of misappropriation by providing extra
breathing space for the use of a person's name in connection
with matters of public interest."155
2. The Right of Publicity and Copyright Law
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitu-
tion is the source of Congress' authority to enact federal copy-
right legislation. 56 "The primary purpose of copyright. . . is to
152. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562,
574-78 (1977); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 n.3 (9th Cir.
1992); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publishing, 971 F.2d 302, 309-10 (9th
Cir. 1992); Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 459 (Bird, C.J., concurring); Maheu, 247 Cal.
Rptr. at 312; Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 349-50 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984).
153. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344(d).
154. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 309-10 (citing Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 349-50,
352).
155. Id. at 310 n.10. Similarly, New York's privacy statute, which prevents
nonconsensual use of the name, portrait, or picture of another for advertising or
trade purposes, N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992), has a judicially-
created exception for news accounts. See Stephano v. New Group Publications, 64
N.Y.2d 174, 185, 474 N.E.2d 580, 585, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220, 225 (1984). Note that
unlike California, New York has no common law cause of action for appropriation
of a person's name or likeness. See Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 135, 140,
480 N.E.2d 349, 353, 490 N.Y.S.2d 735, 739 (1985). See also supra notes 42, 65 for
discussions of New York's privacy statute.
156. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE
DOCTRINES 20 (3d ed. 1993). Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 provides in relevant
part: "The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
This language is known as the "Copyright Clause" of the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 548-49 (1973).
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secure 'the general benefits derived by the public from the la-
bors of authors.'"157 Under the current Copyright Act ("the
Act"), 158 a work must be an "original work[ ] of authorship [and]
fixed in any tangible medium of expression" to receive copyright
protection. 159 It must also fall within the subject matter set out
in § 102 of the Act.160 The subject matter protected by § 102 in-
cludes literary works, musical works, dramatic works, pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works, motion pictures and other audio-
visual works, sound recordings, and architectural works. 161
Under the Act, authors have the exclusive right to make
and distribute copies or phonorecords of their works, to sell,
rent, lease, or otherwise transfer their works, to perform and
display their works publicly, and to prepare derivative works of
their copyrighted works. 16 2
157. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03(A)
(1991) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp.
v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127
(1932)).
158. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Congress passed the first Copyright Act in 1790. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1
Stat. 124 (repealed 1831), cited in NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 157, at OV-1.
159. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988); see also H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
51-58 (1976), reprinted in GOLDSTEIN, supra note 156, at 561.
160. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note
156, at 564.
161. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
162. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). Remedies provided under the Copyright Act for
infringement of the copyright owner's exclusive rights include injunctions, im-
poundment of copies or phonorecords made in violation of the Act, damages, and
profits. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-11 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
The rights granted by § 106 can be thought of as a "bundle of rights," similar
to the "bundle of rights" enjoyed by the owner of real property. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106. In the case of real property, if any of those rights are impeded, the value of
that owner's real property is decreased. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhat-
tan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982). Real Property law balances the prop-
erty owner's rights to use and enjoy his or her real property against the public's
right to some restrictions on that use for the common public good. Id. at 426 (stat-
ing that restrictions on an owner's use of his or her real property are often permit-
ted "where deemed necessary to promote the public interest") (citing Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)), cited in EDWARD H. RABIN &
ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KwALL, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW 4
(3d ed. 1992). Similarly, intellectual property law has struck a balance between
the intellectual property owner's right to control his work and the public's access to
the work. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 156 and authorities cited therein. See also
generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (Copyright Act); 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-1127 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (Lanham Act-trademarks and unfair compe-
tition); 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988) (Patent Act).
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Prior to the Act's enactment, both Congress and the indi-
vidual state legislatures had promulgated their own copyright
laws. 16 3 However, with the 1976, Act Congress ended the dual
state and federal schemes, 16 4 preempting all state laws and
rights which are "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights"
within the Act.165 This does not mean that the states have no
power in the area of intellectual property rights, but the various
state rights and remedies cannot conflict with the Act.166 The
legislative history of section 301 of the Act 167 states that federal
copyright law does not preempt state law rights of publicity, "as
long as the [state] causes of action contain elements, such as an
invasion of personal rights, that are 'different in kind' from
copyright infringement."168
163. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 157, at OV-3.
164. Id.
165. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988); see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 157,
at OV-3.
166. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 157, § 1.01(B). As a general proposi-
tion, states remain free to develop their own intellectual property law so long as it
does not conflict with federal intellectual property law. See id. In Bonito Boats v.
Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989), the Supreme Court stated that "the
Patent and Copyright Clauses [of the U.S. Constitution] do not, by their own force
or by negative implication, deprive the States of the power to adopt rules for the
promotion of intellectual creation within their own jurisdictions." Id. at 165.
"Thus, where 'Congress determines that neither federal protection nor freedom
from restraint is required by the national interest,' the States remain free to pro-
mote originality and creativity in their own domains." Id. (quoting Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 559 (1973)).
For other Supreme Court cases discussing preemption and the co-existence of
state and federal intellectual property law, see Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.,
440 U.S. 257 (1979); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); Brulotte v. Thys Co.,
379 U.S. 29 (1965); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234 (1965);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), cited in GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 156, at 21 n.*.
167. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). Section 301(a) provides in relevant part:
[AIll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in
works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and
come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and
103 ... are governed exclusively by this title.... [No person is entitled to
any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law
or statutes of any State.
Id.
168. BooRsTYN, supra note 24, § 4:11.
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Congress' power to act under the Constitution with respect
to copyright protection is broad. 169 However, Congress is not re-
quired to exercise this power to its outermost limits.170 It is left
to the discretion of Congress to prescribe the statutory scheme
that it deems necessary.' 7 ' Where Congress determines that
national protection is not necessary, it may allow the states to
protect certain intellectual property rights, provided that the
state laws do not conflict with the areas in which Congress has
acted. 72
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,' v3 the
Supreme Court stated that the right of publicity, protected by
state governments, does not necessarily conflict with the copy-
right or patent rights protected by the federal government. 174
The Court held that although these state and federal rights
may share similar policy objectives, a state could protect an en-
tertainer's economic interests through the right of publicity as
long as the state's regulatory power in this area did not conflict
with congressional legislation. 175
Federal preemption was found, however, in Baltimore Ori-
oles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n. 76 In Balti-
more Orioles, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that the major league baseball clubs' copyright in the telecasts
of baseball games preempted the players' publicity rights in
their game-time performances. 77 The court reasoned that the
three-part test for preemption had been satisfied. 78 First, the
169. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 562 (1972).
170. Id.
171. Id. For example, Congress added sound recordings to the subject matter
protected under the Act in 1971. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85
Stat. 391 (1971).
172. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 559.
173. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
174. See id. at 573-77.
175. Id. at 577.
176. 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987).
177. Id. at 679. The players argued that broadcasts of their performances
were made without their consent, which violated their right of publicity. Id. at
674.
178. Id. A right is preempted by the Copyright Act if: (1) the work in which
the right is asserted is fixed in a tangible form; (2) the work in which the right is
asserted comes within the subject matter of copyright under § 102 of the Act; and
(3) the state right in question is equivalent to any of the exclusive rights granted in
§ 106 of the Act. Id. at 674, 676. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 156, at 773 (citing II
186 [Vol. 15:161
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players' performances were fixed in a tangible medium of ex-
pression.179 Second, their performances came within the subject
matter of copyright under § 102, as part of an audiovisual
work.18 0 Third, the state law right of publicity was "equivalent"
to one of the rights within the general scope of § 106, since the
state right was violated by the exercise of the rights set forth in
§ 106.181
3. Parody Defense and the Right of Publicity
"[P]arody is a form of artistic expression, protected by the
First Amendment."182 The Supreme Court has defined parody,
for purposes of copyright law, as "the use of some elements of a
prior author's composition to create a new one that, at least in
part, comments on that author's work.' 83 Parody is often used
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT-PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 15.2 (1989)); see
also supra note 167 for the text of § 301, supra text accompanying notes 159-61 for
a discussion of § 102, and supra note 162 and accompanying text for a discussion of
§ 106.
179. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 674. Being "fixed in a tangible medium of
expression" is one of the requirements for copyright protection. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a); see also supra text accompanying note 159. Live telecasts are fixed in a
tangible medium of expression by the simultaneous videotape recording of the
event as it is being broadcast. See Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 674; see also
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 156, at 562-63; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "fixed"). The
performance is thus embodied in a copy (the videotape of the telecast), which en-
ables it to be perceived, reproduced, and otherwise communicated indefinitely."
Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 675.
180. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 676-77. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(aX6); see also
supra text accompanying note 161. Although the court in Baltimore Orioles found
that the players' performances lacked sufficient creativity to be copyrightable, it
noted that "section 301(a) preempts rights claimed in works that lack sufficient
creativity to be copyrightable . . . [in order] to prevent the states from granting
protection to works which Congress has concluded should be in the public domain,"
that is, works which lack creativity. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 676 n.23.
181. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 676. By exercising rights granted under
§ 106, such as performance, distribution, and display, the state right of publicity
was "equivalent" to a right granted by the Act. Id. at 677.
182. Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing, 886 F.2d 490,
493 (2d Cir. 1989).
183. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1172 (1994). The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has defined parody as "when one artist, for comic
effect or social commentary, closely imitates the style of another artist and in so
doing creates a new art work that makes ridiculous the style and expression of the
original." Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1992).
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as a defense to claims of copyright infringement.184 The defense
derives from the fair use exception to copyright infringement
under the Act. 8 5
Under § 107 of the Act, the use of an author's copyrighted
work is not an infringement if it constitutes a fair use. 8 6 Fair
use is the "privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to
use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without
[the owner's] consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to
the owner." 8 7 Examples of fair use under § 107 include "criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship, or
research ... ."188 The terms "criticism" and "comment" include
parody. 8 9 Section 107 sets out four factors that should be ex-
amined to determine whether a use is fair: (1) the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commer-
cial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 90 (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work;' 9 ' (3) the amount and substan-
tiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as
a whole; 192 and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential mar-
ket for or value of the copyrighted work. 93 Commentators,
184. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994); Rogers v.
Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); Elsmere Music v. National Broadcasting Co.,
623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
In addition to copyright infringement, parody has been asserted as a defense
to claims of trademark infringement, e.g., Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 493; L.L. Bean,
Inc. v. Drake Publishers, 811 F.2d 26, 27, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1987), intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress and libel, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,
47-49 (1988), and infringement of the right of publicity, e.g., White v. Samsung
Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
185. See, e.g., Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171; Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309-10.
186. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
187. Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966)
(quoting HORACE G. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)).
188. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
189. See Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171-72 (stating that "parody, like other com-
ment or criticism, may claim fair use under [ ] 107"); Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310
(stating that "parody and satire are valued forms of criticism, [and are] encouraged
because [they] foster[ ] the creativity protected by the copyright law").
190. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988).
191. Id. § 107(2).
192. Id. § 107(3).
193. Id. § 107(4). See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 561 (1985); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986).
188
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making an analogy to copyright law, have stated that a parody
defense can be applied to a right of publicity claim. 194
III. The Case: White v. Samsung Electronics America 95
A. Facts
In White v. Samsung Electronics America,'96 Samsung Elec-
tronics America and its advertising agency, David Deutsch As-
sociates, ran a series of advertisements in several national
publications. 197 The common theme of these advertisements
was that present Samsung products would still be in use in the
twenty-first century. 198 The advertisements used the vehicles of
humor, exaggeration, and popular culture to convey Samsung's
message, and each displayed a different Samsung product.199
For example, one advertisement showed the outrageous talk-
show host Morton Downey, Jr. with the caption: "Presidential
candidate. 2008 A.D."200 Another advertisement poked fun at
health-food enthusiasm by depicting raw steak with the cap-
tion: "Revealed to be health food. 2010 A.D." 20 1 The advertise-
ment at issue in White depicted a robot wearing a gown, blond
wig, and jewelry, standing next to a game board similar to that
used on the Wheel of Fortune game show set.20 2 The advertise-
ment's caption read: "Longest running game show. 2012 A.D." 20 3
The Wheel of Fortune game show is one of the most popular
in television history and has an audience of about forty million
viewers daily.20 4 Vanna White, the popular hostess of the show,
turns the letters of a game board like the one depicted in the
194. See, e.g., MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 26, § 8.16(B)(5); Gretchen
A. Pemberton, The Parodist's Claim to Fame: A Parody Exception to the Right of
Publicity, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 97 (1993). See also infra part IV.D.
195. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
196. Id.
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Samsung advertisement.205 Unlike the other celebrities who
appeared in the other Samsung advertisements, Vanna White
was not paid for the advertisement. 20 6  However, the
"[d]efendants referred to the ad as the 'Vanna White' ad."20 7
B. Procedural History
After the advertisement had been published, White sued
both Samsung and Deutsch in the United States District Court
for the Central District of California. She brought causes of ac-
tion under California Civil Code section 3344, California com-
mon law right of publicity, and § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.208
The defendants asserted a First Amendment defense and a
"parody defense."20 9 The district court granted summary judg-
ment against White on all causes of action.210 White appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.211
C. Holding
The court of appeals quickly disposed of White's California
Civil Code section 3344 claim, holding that the defendants had
not used her "likeness" within the meaning of that term under
205. Id. The Wheel of Fortune had a similarly attractive hostess prior to
White's tenure on the program. See Brief of Appellees at 3, White v. Samsung
Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (No. 90-55840) [hereinafter Brief of De-
fendant-Appellees].
206. White, 971 F.2d at 1396.
207. Id.
208. Id. See generally Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. V
1993). Discussion of White's Lanham Act claim is beyond the scope of this Note.
209. White, 971 F.2d at 1401. The defendants argued that although the depic-
tion of the robot was contained in an advertisement and could be deemed commer-
cial speech, it was still afforded "a large measure of protection under the First
Amendment." Brief of Defendant-Appellees, supra note 205, at 14 (citing Board of
Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989); U.S. Healthcare v. Blue Cross, 898 F.2d 914
(3d Cir. 1990)). For further discussion of the commercial speech doctrine, see infra
notes 296-98 and accompanying text.
The defendants also argued that their advertisement was afforded protection
as a fair use parody. Brief of Defendant-Appellees, supra note 205, at 16 (citing
Elsmere Music v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980); Tin Pan
Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Columbia Pic-
tures v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348, 354 (S.D. Cal. 1955)). See
supra part II.F.3 for a discussion of fair use parody.
210. White, 971 F.2d at 1396-97.
211. Id. at 1397.
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section 3344.212 The court reasoned that the defendants' adver-
tisement featured a robot with mechanical features and "not,
for .example, a manikin molded to White's precise features."213
The court found it unnecessary to decide how much of a resem-
blance. would be needed to constitute a 'likeness" under section
3344.214 Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's
dismissal of White's section 3344 claim.215
The court next examined White's common law right of pub-
licity claim, applying the elements set out by the court in East-
wood v. Superior Court.216 The White court noted that the
district court had dismissed the common law claim for failure to
satisfy the second element, the appropriation of the plaintiff's
name or likeness to the defendant's advantage, since the de-
fendants had not appropriated White's likeness in the robot
advertisement. 217
Although the court of appeals in White agreed that the de-
fendants had not used White's likeness, it stated that the com-
mon law right of publicity is not confined only to appropriation
of name or likeness.218 The court reasoned that since the East-
wood case involved the use of photographs of the plaintiff, actor
Clint Eastwood, the Eastwood court did not have the occasion
"to consider the extent beyond the use of name or likeness to
which the right of publicity reaches."219 The White court noted
that the Eastwood court had held that "the right of publicity
'may be' pleaded by alleging, inter alia, appropriation of name
or likeness, not that the action may be pleaded only in those
212. Id. Likeness is not defined under § 3344. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3344. See also supra part II.E for a discussion of § 3344.
213. White, 971 F.2d at 1397 (citing Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460,
463 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that an imitation of entertainer Bette Midler's voice
did not come within the definition of "likeness" under section 3344, since "likeness"
meant visual image, not a vocal imitation)). See supra text accompanying notes
109-14 for a discussion of Midler.
214. White, 971 F.2d at 1397.
215. Id.
216. Id. (citing Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983)). The elements for a common law right of publicity claim are: (1) the defend-
ant's use of the plaintiff's identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff's name or like-
ness to defendant's advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and






terms."220 The White court concluded that the name or likeness
formulation was simply "a description of the types of cases in
which the cause of action had been recognized." 221
The White court stated that the notion that right of public-
ity claims are not limited to appropriations of name or likeness
had its origin in William Prosser's article, Privacy.222 The court
noted that although Prosser focused on appropriations of name
or likeness in his article, he also stated that "[i]t is not impossi-
ble that there might be appropriation of the plaintiff's identity,
as by impersonation, without the use of either his name or his
likeness, and that this would be an invasion of his right of pri-
vacy."22 The court then stated that Prosser's statement had
been borne out by the case law.224
The White court cited several cases to support its holding
that common law right of publicity claims are not limited to ap-
propriations of a person's name or likeness. First, the court
noted that in Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,225
the plaintiff's claim was permitted to go to the jury "[e]ven
though the defendant had not appropriated the plaintiff's name
or likeness."226 The White court noted that the defendants in
Motschenbacher had used a photograph of plaintiff's race car in
its advertisement and, although the defendant was actually
driving the car in the photograph, his features were not visi-
ble. 227 Next, the White court noted that in Midler v. Ford Motor
Co.,228 plaintiff Bette Midler had stated a valid claim for viola-
tion of her right of publicity where the defendants had appropri-
ated "part of her identity" by using a "sound-alike" singer to
replicate her voice.229 Finally, the White court noted that in
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1397 (citing Prosser, supra note 31, at 401-07).
223. Id. at 1397-98 (quoting Prosser, supra note 31, at 401 n.155).
224. Id. at 1398 (citing Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988);
Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983); Mot-
schenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974)).
225. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974). See supra notes 90-105 and accompanying
text.
226. White, 971 F.2d at 1398.
227. Id.; see Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 822-23.
228. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). See supra text accompanying notes 109-14.
229. White, 971 F.2d at 1398 (citing Midler, 849 F.2d at 463-64).
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Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets,230 entertainer Johnny
Carson recovered for violation of his right of publicity where the
phrase, "Here's Johnny," had been used without his permission
on the defendant's portable toilets.231
The court in White concluded that these cases stood for the
proposition that the common law right of publicity does not re-
quire that appropriations of identity be accomplished through
only a "laundry list of specific means" to be actionable. 232 The
court reasoned that if "the celebrity's identity is commercially
exploited, there has been an invasion of his right [of publicity]
whether or not his 'name or likeness' is used."233 The court fur-
ther reasoned that while the individual characteristics of the
advertisement may not have implicated White's identity, when
all of its aspects were viewed together, including the familiar
game board and the robot dressed in female clothing, the adver-
tisement could only have been designed to evoke the identity of
Vanna White; thus, the defendants had appropriated her iden-
230. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
231. White, 971 F.2d at 1398 (citing Carson, 698 F.2d at 835-37). The Carson
court reasoned that Carson's common law right of publicity had been violated be-
cause the phrase, "Here's Johnny," was clearly associated with Carson's identity.
Carson, 698 F.2d at 836. The court noted that violation of the common law right of
publicity may be accomplished by means other than the use of a name or likeness.
Id. at 835. This rationale was similar to that used in Motschenbacher. See id.
Two cases on which the Carson court relied, Ali v. Playgirl, 447 F. Supp. 723
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) and Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979),
were cases in which slogans or nicknames associated with famous persons were
used in portraits or advertisements. In Ali, former heavyweight champion
Muhammad Ali sued Playgirl magazine for, inter alia, violation of his common law
right of publicity. Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 723. The defendants had published a photo-
graph in which a nude African American man was seated on a stool in the corner of
a boxing ring with the caption, "Mystery Man." An accompanying verse identified
the man as "The Greatest," a phrase with which Ali had long been associated. Ali,
447 F. Supp. at 727.
The plaintiff in Hirsch was a famous football player known by the nickname
"Crazy Legs." Hirsch, 280 N.W.2d at 129. The Hirsch court found that the plain-
tiff had stated a valid right of publicity claim where the defendants used the slo-
gan, "Crazy Legs," for its shaving cream. Id. at 137. The court cited William
Prosser's article, Privacy, for the proposition that "a stage or other fictitious name
can be so identified with the plaintiff that he is entitled to protection against its
use." Id. at 137 (citing Prosser, supra note 31, at 404).
The Carson court analogized its facts to Ali and Hirsch, and discussed at some
length the fact that slogans or fictitious stage names, if wrongfully appropriated,
could lead to violations of one's right of publicity. See Carson, 698 F.2d at 835-36.
232. White, 971 F.2d at 1398.
233. Id. (quoting Carson, 698 F.2d at 835).
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tity.234 The court also noted a policy consideration underlying
the right of publicity: protecting the celebrity's valuable com-
mercial interest in his or her identity.235
Finally, the court focused on the defendants' parody de-
fense. 236 The court began by distinguishing the cases cited by
the defendant, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,237 and L.L. Bean,
Inc. v. Drake Publishers.2 38 The court held those cases inappli-
cable, reasoning that the parodies in those cases were for the
purpose of poking fun at the respective plaintiffs, while in
White, the parody was "only tangentially related to the ad's pri-
mary message: 'buy Samsung VCRs."' 239 The court added that
the defendants' parody arguments were "better addressed to
non-commercial parodies."2 0 In a footnote, the court reasoned
that commercial advertising is different from other forms of ex-
pressive activity, when such advertising relies on a celebrity's
fame.241 The court stated that although some types of expres-
sive activity, such as parody, evoke a person's identity, the First
Amendment bars most right of publicity actions in noncommer-
cial cases.242 In the case of commercial advertising, however,
"the First Amendment hurdle is not so high."243 The court noted
234. Id. at 1399. The court also presented a hypothetical to support its con-
clusion that White's right of publicity was violated. The court envisioned an adver-
tisement depicting a mechanical robot with male features, a bald head, and an
African American complexion. Id. The robot wears "Air Jordan" sneakers, a uni-
form similar in color to that of the Chicago Bulls basketball team, and former Chi-
cago Bulls basketball star Michael Jordan's jersey number 23. Id. In the
hypothetical advertisement, the robot performs basketball stunts characteristic of
Michael Jordan. Id. The court concluded that when all of the various aspects of
the advertisement were viewed together, it was clear that the advertisement was
"about Michael Jordan." Id. The court then analogized this hypothetical adverL
tisement to the advertisement of defendants Samsung and Deutsch, concluding
that the defendants' advertisement was "meant to depict" Vanna White. Id.
235. Id. at 1398.
236. Id. at 1401.
237. 485 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1988) (barring the plaintiff's intentional infliction of
emotional distress and libel claims on First Amendment grounds, where defend-
ant's national magazine published a cartoon parody of plaintiff).
238. 811 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding that an injunction preventing
continued distribution of a parody of plaintiff's catalogue, contained in defendant's
magazine, was "constitutionally impermissible").
239. White, 971 F.2d at 1401.
240. Id.
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that not all right of publicity actions are barred by the First
Amendment.2 " The court concluded that White's common law
right of publicity claim could be submitted to the jury.245
D. The Dissent
Judge Alarcon dissented with respect to the majority's dis-
position of the common law right of publicity and Lanham Act
claims.246 He concurred in the majority's disposition of White's
claim under California Civil Code section 3344.247
The dissent began with a discussion of the majority's dispo-
sition of the common law right of publicity claim, stating that no
holding of a California court had ever authorized recovery for
appropriation of a person's "identity."248 Judge Alarcon noted
that the California cases all required proof of appropriation of a
name or likeness.249 He criticized the two main reasons on
which the majority had rested its "innovative extension" of the
California common law right of publicity. 250
First, Judge Alarcon took issue with the majority's conclu-
sion that the elements of the common law right of publicity
cause of action are permissive rather than mandatory. 251 He
pointed out that the Eastwood decision, on which the majority
based this conclusion, had discussed the differences between
the common law right of publicity and the statutory remedy
under California Civil Code section 3344, but had not included
among those differences appropriations of identity by means
244. Id. (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562
(1977)). See supra text accompanying notes 173-75 for a discussion of Zacchini.
245. White, 971 F.2d at 1402.
246. Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. (citing Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979); Gug-
lielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 457 (Cal. 1979) (permitting the
use of the name, Rudolph Valentino, in a fictional biography), see supra text accom-
panying notes 146-49 for a discussion of Guglielmi; In re Weingand, 41 Cal. Rptr.
778 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964), see supra note 89 for a discussion of Weingand; Fairfield
v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955); see supra
notes 55-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of Fairfield; Gill v. Curtis Pub-
lishing Co., 239 P.2d 630, 632-33, 635 (Cal. 1952) (holding that a magazine's use of
a couple's photograph without consent constituted invasion of privacy and depic-
tion of the couple in a false light in the public eye)).
250. Id. (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
251. Id. See supra notes 218-35 and accompanying text.
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other than name or likeness.252 Second, Judge Alarcon criti-
cized the majority's interpretation of Prosser's statement that
the right of publicity is not limited to appropriations of name or
likeness, reemphasizing that California courts had never found
such an infringement without the use of a plaintiff's name or
likeness. 253 He concluded that these two reasons were "slender
reeds" on which a federal court should base its extension of
state law.254
The dissent also criticized the majority's interpretation of
federal case law, noting that in Motschenbacher, Midler, and
Carson, "the advertisement[s] affirmatively represented that
the person depicted therein was the plaintiff,"255 whereas in
White, no affirmative representations had been made by Sam-
sung.2 56 The rule that the dissent drew from these cases was
that "where identifying characteristics unique to a plaintiff are
the only information as to the identity of the person appearing
in an advertisement, a triable issue of fact had been raised as to
whether his or her identity [was] appropriated."257 However, in
this case, it was clear that a robot, and not Vanna White, was
depicted.258
252. White, 971 F.2d at 1403 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). See Eastwood v. Supe-
rior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
The dissent examined the legislative history of section 3344, noting that it was
amended ten years after Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d
821 (9th Cir. 1974), cited in White, 971 F.2d at 1403 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). See
also Act of Sept. 30, 1984, ch. 1704, § 2, 1984 Cal. Laws 6172. The dissent stated
that in amending the statute, the legislature added only protections of voice and
signature to the methods of appropriation listed in the statute and did not add
appropriation of identity. White, 971 F.2d at 1403 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). See
supra part II.E for a discussion of CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344. The dissent concluded
that the California Legislature had, therefore, "specifically contemplated protec-
tion for interests other than name or likeness . . . but wished to limit [commercial
appropriation actions] to enumerated attributes." White, 971 F.2d at 1403 (Alar-
con, J., dissenting).
253. White, 971 F.2d at 1403 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1403-04 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (citing Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,
849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), see supra text accompanying notes 109-14 for a dis-
cussion of Midler; Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir.
1983), see supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of Carson;
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974), see
supra text accompanying notes 90-105 for a discussion of Motschenbacher).
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Further, the dissent criticized the majority's reasoning that
the attributes of the advertisement depicted Vanna White when
viewed together, reasoning that the majority had confused
White with the role she assumed on the game show.259 The dis-
sent argued that there is a distinction between the performer
and the part he or she plays, and this distinction was essential
for a proper analysis of the facts of this case.260 The dissent rea-
soned that the wig, dress, and jewelry were not unique charac-
teristics of Vanna White but quite common among actresses. 6 1
In addition, the only element in the advertisement that was not
common among other female performers was the Wheel of For-
tune set, which was not part of White's identity, but merely "a
prop with which she interacts in her role as the current hostess"
of the show.26 2 The dissent noted, hypothetically, that if an-
other female with similar physical characteristics appeared on
the set as hostess, White would probably be preempted by fed-
eral law from initiating a right of publicity suit against her,
since White does not own the copyright to the show itself.263
The dissent stated that "the fact that a performer has become
famous for playing a particular role has, until now, never been
sufficient to give the performer a proprietary interest in it."264
Finally, the dissent argued that the majority had given
the defendants' parody defense "short shrift" merely because
the case involved a commercial advertisement. 26 5 The dis-
sent argued that the cases cited by the defendants, Hustler
Magazine v. Falwel1266 and L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publish-
ers,267 could not be so easily dismissed, since in those cases, the
259. Id.
260. Id. (citing Nurmi v. Peterson, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1775, 1777-78 (C.D. Cal.
1989) (distinguishing between performer and role)). See supra text accompanying
notes 115-32 for a discussion of Nurmi.
261. White, 971 F.2d at 1405 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
262. Id.
263. Id. See supra notes 163-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of
federal preemption of state intellectual property law by the Copyright Act.
264. White, 971 F.2d at 1405 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 1407.
266. 485 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1988) (barring the plaintiff's intentional infliction of
emotional distress and libel claims on First Amendment grounds, where defend-
ant's national magazine published a cartoon parody of plaintiff).
267. 811 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding that an injunction preventing
continued distribution of a parody of plaintiff's catalogue, contained in defendant's
magazine, was "constitutionally impermissible").
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defendants, who were selling magazines, pursued a "purely
commercial purpose," just as the defendants did in White. 268
The dissent concluded that the majority's holding would allow
any famous person to bring an action where any commercial ad-
vertisement depicts a character or role performed by the
plaintiff.269
E. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kozinski from the Order
Rejecting the Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc
In a unanimous decision, a three-judge panel of the Ninth
Circuit voted to deny the defendants' petition for rehearing.270
This was the same panel which had originally heard the case.27 1
In addition, a nine-judge panel, in a six-to-three decision, re-
jected the suggestion for rehearing en banc.2 7 2 Judge Kozinski
dissented from the order rejecting the suggestion for rehearing
en banc and was joined by Judges O'Scannlain and Kleinfeld.27 3
Judge Kozinski discussed, largely from a policy standpoint,
the negative implications of the majority's holding, asserting
that it unjustifiably expanded the right of publicity, conflicted
with federal copyright law, raised First Amendment problems,
and was generally "bad law."274 The dissent contended that
under the majority's holding, "it's now a tort .. .to remind the
public of a celebrity ... [and to] simply ... evoke the celebrity's
image in the public's mind."275 The dissent stated that the ma-
jority had created a new and much broader property right under
California law and questioned whether the case law supported
268. White, 971 F.2d at 1407 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (citing Falwell, 485 U.S.
at 47; L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 27).
269. Id. The dissent discussed several hypothetical examples of this proposi-
tion: Gene Autry could sue any performer portraying a singing cowboy, Clint East-
wood could sue any performer playing a tall, soft-spoken cowboy, and Sylvester
Stallone could sue any performer portraying a blue collar boxer. Id.
270. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct, 2443 (1993).
271. Judges Goodwin, Pregerson, and Alarcon comprised the Ninth Circuit
panel that originally heard the case. See White, 971 F.2d at 1395. Note that Judge
Alarcon dissented in the original case, but voted to deny the rehearing. See id. at
1402 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
272. White, 989 F.2d at 1512.
273. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
274. Id. at 1514.
275. Id. Judge Kozinski opined that such a doctrine was "Orwelian." Id.
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such a holding.27 6 Judge Kozinski asserted, as had the dissent
in the original case, that the Wheel of Fortune set, and not the
robot's "attire," was what evoked White's image.277 He argued
that the right of publicity should not extend its protection be-
yond a celebrity's specific physical characteristics. 278 However,
the majority's ruling had gone well beyond the protection of spe-
cific physical characteristics and created in celebrities a right of
publicity in the role they play.279 He reasoned that since the
majority's holding was overbroad and contained no limitations,
such as the traditional, essential intellectual property limita-
tions of fair use or parody, vague claims of "appropriation of
identity" would be brought by plaintiffs, and creativity would be
curtailed by fear of litigation from such claims.2 0
Judge Kozinski also argued that the majority's overly-
broad right of publicity conflicted with the Copyright Act be-
cause it would reduce the value of licenses which copyright own-
ers might grant to others.28' For example, after White, if the
owner of a copyrighted work, such as a movie, granted a license
to another to make a certain use of the copyrighted work, the
licensee might be subjected to right of publicity claims from ac-
tors who appeared in the copyrighted work. 2
Next, Judge Kozinski stated that the majority's holding di-
rectly conflicted with the Copyright Act by failing to recognize a
parody exception to the right of publicity., 3 He reasoned that
since the advertisement did not simply parody Vanna White,
but parodied her appearing in the Wheel of Fortune, a copy-
righted television show, a parody exception should have been
276. Id. at 1515 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
277. Id.; see White, 971 F.2d at 1404 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). See generally
supra text accompanying notes 261-62.
278. White, 989 F.2d at 1515 n.18 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
279. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting). See Nurmi v. Peterson, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d
1775, 1777-78 (C.D. Cal. 1989); see also supra text accompanying notes 115-32 for
a discussion of Nurmi. The plaintiff in White attempted to distinguish Nurmi be-
cause Nurmi involved fictional characters, while White involved a real person.
Brief of Appellant Vanna White at 14-15, White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d
1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (No. 90-55840).
280. White, 989 F.2d at 1516 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
281. Id. at 1518. See also Felix H. Kent, Vanna Keeps Her Fortune, N.Y. L.J.
June 18, 1993, at 3.
282. White, 989 F.2d at 1518 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 1517. See supra part II.F.3 for a discussion of parody.
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recognized, since parodies of copyrighted works are permitted
under federal law.2 4 The dissent added that the Act covers sub-
ject matter "fixed in any tangible medium of expression," and
White's identity "consists entirely of her [look and] appearances
in a fixed, copyrighted TV show."28
In addition, Judge Kozinski asserted that the majority's
overly-broad right of publicity would conflict with the Copyright
Clause of the United States Constitution 286 through the applica-
tion of the domicile choice of law principle.2 7 Domicile is a
choice of law principle in which the substantive law of the state
where the plaintiff is domiciled is applied to adjudicate a
claim.288 The dissent's argument provided that if an out-of-
state defendant created an advertisement using a California
domiciliary's name or likeness, a California court, in which the
California domiciliary brought the right of publicity claim,
would employ the domicile choice of law principle. 28 9 This
would result in California right of publicity law being applied to
adjudicate the claim.290 The out-of-state defendant would be
subject to California's right of publicity law even if the adver-
tisement was permitted under the law of the state in which the
284. White, 989 F.2d at 1517 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 1518 n.26. See supra part II.F.2 for a discussion of the Copyright
Act.
286. See supra note 156 for the text of the Copyright Clause.
287. White, 989 F.2d at 1518 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
288. See Kent, supra note 281, at 3; McCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 18,
§ 11.3(A), (D)(1-3).
A federal district court sitting in diversity must apply the choice of law princi-
ples of the forum state in which it sits. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCE-
DURE § 4.5, at 213 (1985) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487
(1941); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941)). Thus, a federal district court in
California, sitting in diversity, must apply California's choice of law principles to
determine which state's law should be used in deciding the claim. Acme Circus
Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 1983). Although this
proposition seems well settled, see id., it appears that there is much uncertainty as
to what particular choice of law principle the forum state will apply, as there may
be several. See McCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 26, § 11.3(A) (citing WILLIAM
M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAws § 70(a)
(1984)). Choice of law principles include, inter alia, "the law of the place of in-
fringement," "the law of the forum," "the law of the situs of the property," and "the
law of the plaintiff's domicile." See MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 26,
§ 11.3(A)(and synopsis), (D)(1-3).
289. See White, 989 F.2d at 1518 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also Kent,
supra note 281, at 3.
290. See White, 989 F.2d at 1518 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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creator resided and was even if the advertisement never shown
in California. 291 Even when the litigation was in the out-of-
state defendant's forum state, if the court employed the domi-
cile choice of law principle, California's broad right of publicity
law would be applied to adjudicate the claim.292
The dissent noted that "under the ... Copyright Clause a
state's intellectual property laws can stand only so long as they
do not 'prejudice the interests of other states.' "293 Here, since
California's right of publicity could be applied to out-of-state de-
fendants in forums other than California, and since the right of
publicity law of these other forums may not be as broad as Cali-
fornia's, the interests of these other states may indeed be
prejudiced.294
291. Id. at 1518-19 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
292. See Acme, 711 F.2d at 1540.
293. White, 989 F.2d at 1518 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973)).
294. See id. at 1518-19 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also Kent, supra note
281, at 3. The dissent noted that "[tihe broader and more ill-defined a particular
state's right of publicity law is, the more it interferes with the legitimate interests
of other states." White, 989 F.2d at 1518 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
In support of his "domicile argument," Judge Kozinski cited Acme Circus Op-
erating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1983). See White, 989 F.2d at
1518 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Commentator Felix H. Kent, in his article discuss-
ing the White case, made a similar "domicile argument," also citing Acme. See
Kent, supra note 281.
Acme involved a question of whether the right of publicity survived the death
of a celebrity. Acme, 711 F.2d at 1539. The Acme court stated that the question
was whether such a right existed at all, and that this question was one of personal
property law. Id. at 1541. The federal court in Acme applied California choice of
law principles and stated that California applies the law of the domicile to ques-
tions of personal property law. Id. Thus, California right of publicity law was ap-
plied. Id.
The Acme court distinguished the question of whether the right of publicity
existed, as in the case before it, from the question of whether such right had been
infringed. Id. at 1541 & n.1. The court noted that whether the right of publicity
had been infringed was not a question of personal property law, but of tort or con-
tract law. Id. at 1541 n.1. The court stated that under California choice of law
principles, cases involving infringement do not require application of the domicile
choice of law principle, but of the "governmental interests analysis" theory. Id. at
1541 & n.1. Since the domicile principle is not applied, California right of publicity
law may not necessarily be applied. See id.; see also Joplin Enters. v. Allen, 795 F.
Supp. 349, 350-51 (D. Wash. 1992) (stating that Washington courts would apply
"the law of the state having the most significant relationship to [the dispute to]
determine whether [the right of publicity] ha[d] been tortiously infringed") (citing
Bush v. O'Connor, 791 P.2d 915, 918 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990)).
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Finally, Judge Kozinski discussed the First Amendment as-
pects of the majority's holding. 295 As did the dissent in the origi-
nal opinion, Judge Kozinski disagreed with the majority's view
that because the advertisement was commercial speech, it was
undeserving of First Amendment protection. 296 The dissent as-
serted that the majority ignored the Central Hudson test, which
the dissent stated the Supreme Court had established to pre-
vent lower courts from giving "short shrift"297 to commercial
speech in First Amendment contexts. 298
All of the most noted cases applying the domicile conflict of law principle have
been post-mortem right of publicity cases, deciding whether the right existed and
not whether it had been infringed. See, e.g., Acme Circus Operating Co. v. Kuper-
stock, 711 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1983); Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day and Night Co.,
689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982); Factors Etc. v. Pro Arts, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982); Joplin Enters. v. Allen, 795 F. Supp. 349 (D.
Wash. 1992), cited in MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 26, § 11.3(D)(3); South-
east Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence, 66 N.Y.2d 910, 489 N.E.2d 744, 498 N.Y.S.2d 775
(1985).
295. White, 989 F.2d at 1519 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
296. Id. See White, 971 F.2d at 1407-08 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
297. White, 989 F.2d at 1520 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
298. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)). In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court held
that the First Amendment protects commercial speech from unwarranted govern-
mental regulation, although this protection may not be as great as with other con-
stitutionally protected modes of expression. Id. at 563. The Court developed a
four-step test to be applied in commercial speech cases in order to balance the
interests of the state and the speaker. Id. at 566. First, the court determines
whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 564. "For
commercial speech to come within that protection it must at least concern lawful
activity and not be misleading." Id. Second, the court determines "whether the
asserted governmental interest to be served by the restriction on commercial
speech is substantial." Id. "If both inquiries yield positive answers, [the court]
must then decide whether the regulation directly advances the governmental in-
terest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest." Id. In White, Judge Kozinski chastised the majority for not apply-
ing the Central Hudson test, stating that the court "shouldn't thumb [its] nose at
the Supreme Court by just refusing to apply its test." White, 989 F.2d at 1521
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
The Central Hudson case is part of a large body of Supreme Court law involv-
ing state statutory restrictions on commercial speech. See U.S. Healthcare v. Blue
Cross, 898 F.2d 914, 933 n.23 (3d Cir.) (citing Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v.
Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986); Zauder v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471
U.S. 626 (1983); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Metromedia v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981);
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia Pharmacy Bd.
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Pittsburgh Press v.
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IV. Analysis
The defendants' advertisement in the White case may con-
jure up the image of Vanna White in the mind of many who are
familiar with her and the game show of which she is a part, and
it is certainly conceivable that one's initial reaction upon view-
ing the advertisement might be to proclaim that White's like-
ness was appropriated. Nevertheless, closer examination of
prior right of publicity case law reveals that the White court's
decision expanded the boundaries of what constitutes appropri-
ation of a celebrity's common law right of publicity in Califor-
nia. Although this expansion is most likely favored by
celebrities, it has several negative consequences that outweigh
any benefits of increased protection of celebrities' publicity
rights.
The following analysis first examines the White court's dis-
position of Vanna White's claim under California Civil Code sec-
tion 3344 and concludes that the court properly affirmed the
district court's dismissal of this claim. Second, the court's dis-
position of White's common law right of publicity claim is criti-
cized because the court improperly expanded the common law
right of publicity in California. The negative effects of this ex-
panded right of publicity are also examined. Next, it is asserted
that the court provided inadequate analysis in addressing the
defendants' First Amendment defense. In addition, it is as-
serted that the court erred in not providing for a parody defense
to right of publicity claims. Further, the argument is made that
White's common law right of publicity claim should have been
preempted by the Copyright Act. Finally, the dissent's applica-
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); Valentine v. Chris-
tensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 816 (1990); see also City of Cin-
cinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993); Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469 (1989).
Although the line of commercial speech cases leading up to and following Cen-
tral Hudson dealt with state regulation of speech through various statutory
schemes, the court in U.S. Healthcare stated that the doctrine, which created a
subordinate standard of First Amendment protection for commercial speech, "is
not confined to the government regulation line of cases." U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d
at 932. U.S. Healthcare discussed Central Hudson in the context of a defamation
claim stemming from an advertisement. Id. at 936-37. However, except for the
dissent in White, there appear to be no right of publicity cases involving First
Amendment concerns that discuss the Central Hudson test or recommend apply-
ing it in such cases.
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tion of the "domicile" choice of law principle to right of publicity
claims is criticized.
A. The Court Properly Decided the Section 3344 Claim
The majority's decision regarding White's claim under Cali-
fornia Civil Code section 3344 was a sound one. Indeed, the one
issue on which the majority and the two dissents agreed was
whether White's likeness had been appropriated for advertising
purposes under section 3344(a).299 The majority in White held
that since the defendants had "used a robot with mechanical
features and not, for example, a manikin molded to White's pre-
cise features," they had not appropriated her "likeness" under
the statute. 3°° The court noted that the term "'likeness' refers
to a visual image,"301 and since the visual image was not
White's, but that of a robot, the section 3344 claim was properly
rejected by the district court.30 2
In reaching its conclusion on the section 3344 claim, the
majority simply reasoned that "the robot ... [in the advertise-
ment] was not White's 'likeness' within the meaning of section
3344."303 The court provided no purpose or policy reasons for its
decision.30 4 Although the court cited Midler v. Ford Motor
Co.,305 the facts of Midler are inapposite to White;3°6 the major-
ity merely cited Midler for the proposition that the term, "like-
299. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344(a) (West Supp. 1994); see White v. Samsung Elecs.
Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992); id. at 1402 (Alarcon, J., dissenting);
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993). See also supra part II.E for a discussion
of CAL. Cr. CODE § 3344.
300. White, 971 F.2d at 1397.




305. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
306. The defendants in Midler employed a "sound-alike" singer to imitate en-
tertainer Bette Midler's distinctive singing voice in a television advertisement. Id.
at 461. Many who heard the commercial thought that Midler was actually singing
because it "sounded exactly" like one of Milder's recordings. Id. at 461-63. See also
supra text accompanying notes 109-14 for a discussion of Midler. In contrast, the
defendants in White used a robot dressed like a woman, and not, for example, a
Vanna White "look-alike." See White, 971 F.2d at 1397. Indeed, there was no evi-
dence that viewers of the advertisement mistook the robot for Vanna White. See
supra part III.A for a discussion of the facts of White.
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ness," does not refer to a "vocal imitation," but to a "visual
image."30 7
Notwithstanding its lack of reasoning, the court's conclu-
sion regarding White's section 3344 claim was correct for two
reasons. First, it was supported by a plain meaning analysis of
the term, "likeness." "Likeness" is defined as a "[riesemblance
to another .... An imitative appearance: semblance .... An
artistic representation: image."3os The robot dressed in a gown,
wig, and jewelry was not a "resemblance," an "imitative appear-
ance," a "semblance," an "artistic representation," or an "image"
of Vanna White. It was simply a robot dressed in women's
clothes. The defendants did not imitate Vanna White.
Second, the court's decision on this issue is in accord with
the only other case to interpret the term, "likeness," under sec-
tion 3344: Nurmi v. Peterson.3 9 Nurmi held that the term,
"likeness," in civil code section 3344 "means an actual represen-
tation of a person, rather than a close resemblance." 310 Under
this standard, the robot in White would not be Vanna White's
"likeness" since it was not an "actual representation" of her.
B. The Majority Improperly Decided the Common Law Right
of Publicity Claim
The majority's decision regarding Vanna White's common
law right of publicity claim was not as sound as its decision re-
garding her section 3344 claim. The White court held that com-
mon law right of publicity claims are not confined to
appropriations of a person's name or likeness but could arise by
other means as well.311 While it is conceivable that the common
law right of publicity could extend beyond appropriations of
name or likeness,31 2 as discussed below, there must be limits on
307. White, 971 F.2d at 1397 (citing Midler, 849 F.2d at 463).
308. WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DIcrIONARY 693 (1988).
309. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1775 (C.D. Cal. 1989). See supra text accompanying notes
115-32 for a discussion of Nurmi. The majority opinion in White did not cite
Nurmi.
310. Nurmi, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1777. The Nurmi court also noted that the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court had employed the term, "likeness," to mean "an exact copy of
another's features and not merely a suggestive resemblance." Id. (citing Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 427, 431 (1979)).
311. White, 971 F.2d at 1397.
312. Expansion of common law right of publicity claims beyond name or like-
ness is supported by the language of § 3344 and case law. Section 3344(g) states
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how far such a doctrine is extended. Unfortunately, the White
decision extended the common law right of publicity well be-
yond what was supported by case law and sound jurisprudence.
First, the majority overlooked Nurmi v. Peterson,313 which
is remarkably similar to White.314 In Nurmi, the plaintiff al-
leged that the defendant's "Elvira" character appropriated the
plaintiff's likeness in her "Vampira" character. 15 The Nurmi
court held that since the plaintiff did not allege that her "actual
features were used by the defendants for commercial pur-
poses,"316 her common law right of publicity claim failed.317 The
Nurmi court found that neither of the cases cited by the plain-
tiff, Midler v. Ford Motor Co.318 and Chaplin v. Amador,319 sup-
ported the proposition that a right of publicity claim could be
brought for "a person's use of a character that bears a mere re-
semblance to another... "320 The Nurmi court reasoned that in
both of these cases, the plaintiffs' claims were permitted to go
forward only on fraud grounds and "not on right of privacy or
publicity grounds."321
Under the analysis in Nurmi, White's common law right of
publicity claim should have failed, since the defendants' robot
was not a "resemblance" of Vanna White; nor did the defend-
that its remedies are "cumulative and shall be in addition to any others provided
for by law." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(g) (West Supp. 1994). This suggests that
claims beyond the scope of the statute are possible. See McCARTHY ON PUBLICITY,
supra note 26, § 6.4(F)(8); Weinstein, supra note 134, at 432-33, 454-56. Case law
also suggests such an interpretation of the statute. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor
Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425,
443 n.23 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
313. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1775 (C.D. Cal. 1989). See supra text accompanying notes
115-32 for a discussion of Nurmi. See also White, 971 F.2d 1395, 1404 (Alarcon, J.,
dissenting).
314. Since Nurmi was a district court case, it was not binding on the White
court and would have served as merely persuasive authority.
315. Nurmi, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1776.
316. Id. at 1778.
317. Id.
318. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). See supra text accompanying notes 109-14
for a discussion of Midler.
319. 269 P. 544 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928). See supra text accompanying notes 128-
29, 131-32 for a discussion of Chaplin.
320. Nurmi, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1778.
321. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 115-32 for a discussion of Nurmi.
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ants use White's "actual features."322 The wig, gown, and jew-
elry that adorned the robot were not Vanna White's actual
features, but features common to many women.323 The one
unique element of the advertisement which did evoke the image
of Vanna White was the Wheel of Fortune set, but the set is the
property of the show's owners and not an attribute of Vanna
White.324 Allowing recovery for imitating another person's
clothes, props, and mannerisms would "freeze all rights" to
these attributes with the first person to employ them, precisely
the result the Nurmi court sought to avoid.3 25 Moreover, it
would create a property right326 in the relatively common attrib-
utes that comprise a celebrity's personae. Such a result would
stifle creativity, lead to more litigation, and upset the careful
balance that has been struck by courts and legislatures between
the rights of intellectual property owners to control their prop-
erty's use and the rights of the public to have access to public
domain ideas for the enrichment of society.327
Second, the majority in White confused the issue of whether
the common law right of publicity can be violated by means
other than appropriation of name or likeness with the issue of
whether, in a particular case, there has been an actual infringe-
ment of a person's right of publicity. Indeed, the majority ex-
plicitly stated that "the specific means of appropriation are
relevant only for determining whether the defendant has in fact
appropriated the plaintiff's identity."328 This language demon-
strates that the court combined the issue of the means of appro-
priation and the issue of whether there was actual infringement
or appropriation of the right of publicity. This confusion is un-
tenable, since under the formulation set out in Eastwood v. Su-
perior Court329 the means of appropriation and the use of a
322. See Nurmi, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1778.
323. See White, 971 F.2d at 1405 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
324. Id.
325. Nurmi, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1777-78.
326. The right of publicity is considered a property right. See supra note 68
and accompanying text.
327. See White, 989 F.2d at 1515-17 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); Nurmi, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1778.
328. White, 971 F.2d at 1398.
329. 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). See supra note 47 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of Eastwood and the elements of a common law
right of publicity claim.
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plaintiff's identity are separate elements of a common law right
of publicity claim. 330 Moreover, as is demonstrated in the fol-
lowing paragraphs, the White court's analysis is devoid of any
discussion as to why White's common law right of publicity was
infringed by the defendants' advertisement.
The White court relied on Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co.,3l Midler v. Ford Motor Co. ,332 and Carson v. Here's
Johnny Portable Toilets333 for the proposition that recovery
under the common law right of publicity is not limited to appro-
priations of one's name or likeness.334 This proposition is not
disputed. However, the court offered these cases solely for this
proposition.33 5 The court did not offer these cases as factually
analogous to the White case in order to support its decision that
White's claim of infringement of her right of publicity could go
to the jury.336 In fact, the court offered no factually analogous
authority to support its decision that Vanna White's right of
publicity was infringed.3 37
What the court did offer to support its decision was a hypo-
thetical advertisement purporting to demonstrate that the de-
fendants' advertisement violated White's right of publicity.
338
In this hypothetical advertisement, a robot dressed like basket-
ball star Michael Jordan performed basketball stunts for which
Jordan is famous.33 9 The court stated that if all of the various
elements of this hypothetical advertisement were viewed to-
gether, it would be clear that the advertisement was "about
330. As provided by the Eastwood court, the first two elements of a common
law claim for appropriation of name or likeness are: (1) the defendant's use of the
plaintiff's identity; and (2) the appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness. East-
wood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
331. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974). See supra text accompanying notes 90-105
for a discussion of Motschenbacher.
332. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). See supra text accompanying notes 109-14
for a discussion of Midler.
333. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Carson.
334. White, 971 F.2d at 1397-98.
335. See id. at 1397-99.
336. See id.
337. See id.
338. Id. at 1399.
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Michael Jordan."340 The court then analogized this hypothetical
advertisement to the "robot advertisement" of defendants Sam-
sung and Deutsch, concluding that the defendants' advertise-
ment was "meant to depict" Vanna White.341
The court's reliance on Motschenbacher, Midler, Carson,
and the Michael Jordan hypothetical advertisement can be re-
duced to the following syllogism: The right of publicity can be
violated by means other than the appropriation of a celebrity's
name or likeness; the defendants' advertisement reminded
viewers of Vanna White; therefore, the defendants violated
White's right of publicity. The assumption implicit in this syllo-
gism is that reminding viewers of a celebrity violates that celeb-
rity's right of publicity. The cases and the hypothetical do not
support this flawed logic.
From a policy standpoint, should an image in an advertise-
ment that merely reminds viewers of a celebrity be actionable?
Such a rule seems to be without parameters or guidelines, and
without any legal principle for discerning the point at which
summary judgment would be granted in favor of a defendant.
As Judge Kozinski stated in his dissent, such a doctrine is
"Orwellian."32
If the court was, sub silentio, asserting that the facts of
Motschenbacher,343 Midler, 44 and Carson, 5 are analogous to
White and therefore support White's claim of infringement, the
court was in error because these cases are distinguishable.346
In Motschenbacher, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff
race car driver's claim could go to the jury since the defendant
had appropriated the plaintiff's "proprietary interest in his own
identity."347 The court reasoned that although the plaintiff's
"likeness" was not discernible in the defendant's advertise-
ments, the distinctive decorations of the race car caused persons
340. White, 971 F.2d at 1399.
341. Id.
342. White, 989 F.2d at 1514 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
343. See supra text accompanying notes 92-96 for the facts of Motschenbacher.
344. See supra text accompanying note 110 for the facts of Midler.
345. See supra note 231 and accompanying text for the facts of Carson.
346. See White, 971 F.2d at 1403 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
347. Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 825.
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to think the car was the plaintiff's and to infer that the plaintiff
was driving. 348
There are only limited parallels between Motschenbacher
and White. In Motschenbacher, attributes of the plaintiff's iden-
tity, namely, his distinctively decorated car, evoked the plain-
tiff's image in the minds of viewers.3 49 In White, however, the
Wheel of Fortune set, which may have reminded viewers of
Vanna White, was not an attribute of Vanna White; rather, it
was an attribute of the Wheel of Fortune game show.350 Fur-
thermore, in Motschenbacher, the plaintiff was actually driving
his car,351 while in White, the robot was clearly not Vanna
White. Moreover, unlike Motschenbacher, the surrounding cir-
cumstances in the advertisement in White did not lead viewers
to believe that the robot was actually Vanna White.
In Midler, the defendants created the false impression that
entertainer Bette Midler was actually singing in the commer-
cial by using a "sound-alike" singer.352 However, in White, the
defendants did not create the false impression that Vanna
White was in the advertisement; they merely depicted a robot
dressed in women's clothing on the Wheel of Fortune set,353
which could not be mistaken for Vanna White.
In Carson, the defendant used the phrase, "Here's Johnny,"
on its portable toilets.3 54 The court held that entertainer
Johnny Carson's common law right of publicity had been vio-
348. Id. at 827.
349. Id.
350. See generally White, 971 F.2d at 1405 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
351. Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 822.
352. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
353. The court in Nurmi v. Peterson, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1775 (C.D. Cal. 1989),
noted that in Midler, the plaintiff's claim was allowed to go forward because the
defendants had deceived the public into believing that Midler actually sang in the
advertisement. Id. at 1778 (citing Midler, 849 F.2d at 463-64); see also Robert M.
Callagy and Gillian M. Lusins, Commercial Speech and Private Rights, in FALSE
ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH 1993 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. B4-7023, Feb.-Mar. 1993)). This notion of deception is also
present in Motschenbacher. See supra text accompanying notes 90-105, 348 and
accompanying text. The notion of deception is not, however, present in White.
Claims of false endorsement, that is, claims that the public will be deceived
into thinking that Vanna White endorsed Samsung's products, should be brought
under the Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. V 1993). See White, 989
F.2d at 1515 n.17 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
354. Carson, 698 F.2d at 832-33.
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lated, since the phrase, "Here's Johnny," was clearly associated
with Carson's identity.355 The court reasoned, similar to the
reasoning in Motschenbacher and Midler, that violation of the
common law right of publicity may be accomplished by means
other than the use of name or likeness.356
Two cases upon which the Carson court greatly relied, Ali
v. Playgir 357 and Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son,358 were cases in
which slogans or nicknames associated with famous persons
were used in portraits or advertisements. 359 The Carson court
analogized its facts to these cases360 and devoted much discus-
sion to the notion that slogans or fictitious stage names, if
wrongfully appropriated, could lead to violations of one's right
of publicity.361 Thus, Carson stands primarily for the proposi-
tion that a slogan or name which is clearly identified with a well
known celebrity, when wrongfully appropriated, may lead to a
violation of the common law right of publicity. Unlike Carson,
however, White did not involve use of a name or slogan of a ce-
lebrity. Therefore, Carson should not have been used by the
White court to support the conclusion that Vanna White stated
a valid claim for infringement of her right of publicity.
C. The Majority's First Amendment Analysis Was Inadequate
The result reached by the White court with respect to the
defendants' free speech argument 362 was correct; however, the
court dismissed the defendants' First Amendment defense with
little discussion. The lack of analysis on this issue is
unfortunate.
The defendants in White, argued that although their adver-
tisement was commercial speech, it was still afforded "a large
355. Id. at 836.
356. Id. at 835.
357. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
358. 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979).
359. See supra note 231 for a discussion of Ali and Hirsch.
360. See Carson, 698 F.2d at 835.
361. See id. at 835-36. The Carson court also cited William Prosser's article,
Privacy, for the proposition that "a stage or other fictitious name can be so identi-
fied with the plaintiff that he can be so identified with its use." Id. at 836 (citing
Prosser, supra note 31, at 404). The Carson court also cited Prosser's treatise on
the law of torts for the proposition that a plaintiff's name may be a symbol of his
identity. Id. at 836 & n.2 (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 102, § 117, at 805).
362. See White, 971 F.2d at 1401 & n.3.
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measure of protection" under the First Amendment. 363 The
court dismissed this argument as "unavailing," reasoning that
the type of speech involved was commercial,364 and the level of
First Amendment protection typically afforded commercial
speech is low. 365
In his dissent, Judge Kozinski asserted that the majority
had dismissed the defendants' First Amendment argument too
quickly because the speech was commercial.3 66 Since White is
now the law in the Ninth Circuit, 367 it would have been helpful
for the majority to provide some discussion of the extent to
which the First Amendment restrains the right of publicity.
The majority merely stated in a footnote that "the First Amend-
ment hurdle will bar most right of publicity actions"368 against
expressive activity which may evoke one's identity, such as par-
odies. 369 In the next sentence, the court stated that "the First
Amendment hurdle is not [as] high" for commercial advertising
as it may be for other types of speech.370
While it is true that the level of protection afforded com-
mercial speech is lower than other forms of constitutionally pro-
tected speech, 371 commercial speech is, nevertheless, protected
under the First Amendment.37 2 In addition, commercial adver-
tising can be expressive activity, as it was in White. Moreover,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the important
value of commercial speech.373 Since commercial speech can be
363. Brief of Defendant-Appellees, supra note 205, at 14 (citing Board of
Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989); U.S. Healthcare v. Blue Cross, 898 F.2d 914
(3d Cir. 1990)). See supra text accompanying notes 242-44. See also supra notes
296-98 and accompanying text.
364. White, 971 F.2d at 1401 n.3.
365. Id. (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
366. White, 989 F.2d at 1401 n.3.
367. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Samsung Elecs. Am. v. White, 113
S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
368. White, 971 F.2d at 1401 n.3.
369. Id.
370. See id.
371. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1512 (1993)
(citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978); Central Hud-
son Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)).
372. See id. and cases cited therein. See also supra note 298.
373. See Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1512 n.17 (stating that "significant
societal interests are served by [commercial speech]") (citing Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); FTC v.
[Vol. 15:161212
52http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss1/7
1994] WHITE v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA 213
expressive and serve valid societal purposes, the First Amend-
ment defense should not have been dismissed as summarily as
it was in White; rather, the court should have provided some
analysis as to the role First Amendment considerations play in
right of publicity claims.
Section 3344(e) of the California Civil Code demonstrates
that the California Legislature was concerned with balancing
First Amendment considerations in right of publicity cases.
Section 3344(e) provides that the use of a person's name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness is not actionable "solely be-
cause the . .. use is commercially sponsored .... Rather, it
shall be a question of fact whether or not the use . . . was so
directly connected with the commercial sponsorship" as to be ac-
tionable. 374 This language suggests that the California Legisla-
ture considered at least a minimum level of First Amendment
breathing room for commercial speech when it enacted this stat-
ute. The White court should have provided similar breathing
room in the common law right of publicity doctrine. 375
In his dissent, Judge Kozinski argued that the court should
have applied the four factor test set out in Central Hudson Gas
& Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, in order to bal-
ance First Amendment concerns against the plaintiff's right of
publicity.376 While a balancing approach would have been the
preferred approach to a First Amendment defense, there are
two reasons why the majority in White probably did not apply
the Central Hudson test. First, although Central Hudson and
its progeny377 afford protection to commercial speech, when the
balancing test of Central Hudson is applied, commercial speech
will receive less protection than non-commercial speech. Thus,
Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568, 603-04 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring))); Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-62 (stating that "[clommercial expression not only serves
the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the
societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of information").
374. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344(e) (West Supp. 1994).
375. See Weinstein, supra note 134, at 453-54 (stating that the question of
fact provided for in California Civil Code § 3344(e) also applies to common law
claims).
376. White, 989 F.2d at 1519-20 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Central Hud-
son, 447 U.S. at 566). See supra note 298 for a discussion of the Central Hudson
test.
377. See supra note 298 and cases cited therein.
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the outcome of the court's decision on this point, even if it had
applied the test, may not have differed.
Second, Central Hudson and its progeny were cases involv-
ing direct statutory regulation of commercial speech through
government regulation.378 The common law right of publicity
claim in White, however, involved an action between two pri-
vate parties to vindicate a private right, the residual effect of
which may have been the curtailment of commercial speech.
There is little authority for applying the Central Hudson analy-
sis to non-statutory cases such as White.379 Indeed, other right
of publicity cases involving First Amendment issues do not
mention Central Hudson.3 80
Moreover, a closer examination of the Central Hudson
test 38 1 suggests that its language is not suitable for use with
right of publicity claims. Under the first Central Hudson factor,
the court must determine whether the expression is protected
by the First Amendment.38 2 For commercial speech to come
within that protection it must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading.383 , Under the second factor, the court must deter-
mine whether the restriction on commercial speech serves a
substantial governmental interest.384 If both inquiries yield
positive answers, the court must then decide whether the regu-
lation directly advances the governmental interest and whether
it is more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.38 5
The language of this test is difficult to apply to the situation
in White or other common law claims by private citizens for ap-
propriation of the right of publicity. The elements of the test
are phrased in terms of balancing statutory regulation of com-
378. See U.S. Healthcare v. Blue Cross, 898 F.2d 914, 933 n.23 (3d Cir. 1990).
See also supra note 298.
379. U.S. Healthcare may be the only case discussing Central Hudson in a
non-statutory context. U.S. Healthcare involved a defamation claim stemming
from an advertisement. See U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 936-37. See also supra
note 298.
380. See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publishing, 971 F.2d 302
(9th Cir. 1992); Cher v. Forum Intl, 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982); Eastwood v.
Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
381. See supra note 298 for a discussion of the Central Hudson test.
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mercial speech against First Amendment rights. Since the Cen-
tral Hudson test would not have been easily applied to the
issues in White, Judge Kozinski was incorrect in chastising the
majority for not doing so.386
D. The Right of Publicity Should Have a Parody Defense
The defendants in White argued that their advertisement
should have been afforded protection as a fair use parody.38 7
Judge Kozinski's dissent also argued that the majority's deci-
sion conflicted with the Copyright Act in failing to recognize a
parody exception.388 Judge Kozinski noted that the defendants
had parodied a copyrighted work, the Wheel of Fortune televi-
sion program, and that fair use parodies of copyrighted works
are permitted under the Act.3 89
There are several probable reasons why the White court did
not seriously consider a fair use parody defense. First, fair use
parody is a defense to a claim of copyright infringement under
the Copyright Act.39° Since there was no claim of copyright in-
fringement in White, there was no occasion to apply the fair use
analysis as set out in the Act. 391
A second probable reason is that the court did not desire to
break new ground and establish a parody defense for right of
publicity claims. There appear to be no right of publicity cases
providing for a parody defense. Furthermore, even Judge
Kozinski, who advocated such a defense, did not give any indi-
cation of how such an exception would operate; 92 he simply
386. White, 989 F.2d at 1520-21 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Judge Kozinshi
stated that "the court shouldn't thumb its nose at the Supreme Court by... refus-
ing to apply [the Central Hudson] test." Id. at 1521.
387. Brief of Defendant-Appellees, supra note 205, at 16 (citing Columbia Pic-
tures v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348, 354 (S.D. Cal. 1955); El-
smere Music v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980); Tin Pan
Apple v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)). See White, 989
F.2d at 1517; see also supra part Il.F.3 for a discussion of parody and fair use.
388. White, 989 F.2d at 1517 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
389. Id.
390. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994); Walt Dis-
ney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir 1978). See also supra notes 184-85
and accompanying text.
391. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
392. See White, 989 F.2d at 1517-18 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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stated that "I doubt even a name-and-likeness-only right of pub-
licity can stand without a parody exception."393
Judge Kozinski was correct, however, in pointing out a con-
flict with the Copyright Act that may result from the White deci-
sion. He stated that a parodist who lawfully parodies a
copyrighted work may be subject to a right of publicity claim
from someone who appears in the work.3 94 He gave an example
where, based upon the court's decision in White, a parody of the
motion picture Star Wars, which included the character Luke
Skywalker, could be subject to a right of publicity claim from
Mark Hamill, the actor who portrayed Luke Skywalker.395 This
conflict with the Copyright Act demonstrates the need for a par-
ody defense for right of publicity claims. Moreover, the four fair
use factors listed in the Copyright Act 396 would provide a sound
analytical framework for a parody defense to right of publicity
claims.
E. The White Rule Reduces the Value of Copyrights
There is an economic rationale for criticizing the decision in
White: a right of publicity which is overly broad reduces the
value of licenses which copyright owners may grant to others. 397
This is an argument advanced by both Judge Kozinski and Felix
Kent.398
Suppose the owner of a copyrighted work, such as a movie,
grants a license to another to make a certain use of that work.
Under the White decision, the licensee could be subject to a
right of publicity claim from actors who appear in the copy-
righted work.399 If the defendants in White had obtained a li-
cense from the owners of the Wheel of Fortune copyright, would
the defendants still have been subject to a claim from Vanna
White for "evoking her image"? Under the White decision, the
answer may be "yes." Moreover, under White, Vanna White
393. Id. at 1519.
394. Id. at 1517.
395. Id.
396. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. See also supra text accompanying notes 190-94.
397. See supra note 162 and accompanying text for a discussion of the exclu-
sive rights under the Copyright Act.
398. White, 989 F.2d at 1518 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); Kent, supra note 281,
399. See White, 989 F.2d at 1518 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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could bring a right of publicity claim against her future replace-
ment if he or she "evoked White's image" in the minds of the
public. 40° It is possible that fear of such claims will reduce the
value of copyright licenses4°1 or deter prospective licensees from
obtaining licenses altogether.
F. White's Right of Publicity Claim Should Have Been
Preempted by the Copyright Act
A comparison of White with Baltimore Orioles v. Major
League Baseball Players Ass'n4°2 suggests that White's right of
publicity claim should have been preempted by the Copyright
Act. In Baltimore Orioles, professional baseball players claimed
that their rights of publicity in their game-time performances
were wrongfully appropriated by the major league baseball
clubs since broadcasts of these performances were made with-
out their consent.403 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
that since the clubs held the copyright in the telecasts,40 4 the
telecasts "preempt[ed] the Players' rights of publicity in their
game-time performances."40 5 The court reasoned that the three-
part test for preemption under the Copyright Act had been
satisfied.406
First, the work in which White claimed a right was "fixed in
a tangible medium of expression."407 White claimed a right in
400. See id. at 1516.
401. See Kent, supra note 281, at 3.
402. 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986). See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Baltimore Orioles.
403. Id. at 674.
404. Id. at 668. The court stated that the telecasts were "fixed in a tangible
form" and were "original works of authorship," as required under § 102(a) of the
Copyright Act. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See also supra
notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
405. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 674.
406. Id. at 677. A right is preempted by the Copyright Act if: (1) the work in
which the right is asserted is fixed in a tangible form; (2) the work in which the
right is asserted comes within the subject matter of copyright under § 102 of the
Act; and (3) the state right in question is equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
granted in § 106 of the Act. Id. at 674, 676; see 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1988); see also
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 156, at 773 (citing II GOLDSTEIN, supra note 178, § 15.2).
See supra note 167 for the text of§ 301(a); see also supra notes 178-81 and accom-
panying text.
407. Section 102 of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides copyright protection to




the "attributes of her identity," namely, the wig, gown, and jew-
elry which adorned the robot.408 However, under Nurmi v. Pe-
terson,4°9 White should not have been able to claim these
attributes as her own.410 These are characteristics common to
many women.411 The Wheel of Fortune set is the only unique
attribute of the advertisement that reminds viewers of White,
and it is not White's intellectual property but the property of
the owners of the Wheel of Fortune copyright. 412 The only aspect
of the advertisement in which White could attempt to assert a
right is the Wheel of Fortune set, which is fixed in a tangible
form. Thus, the first element of the preemption test is satisfied.
The second element is satisfied because the Wheel of Fortune
comes within the subject matter of copyright as an audiovisual
work.413 Third, the right of publicity is equivalent to rights
within the general scope of § 106 of the Act, since the right of
publicity was violated by the exercise of such rights.414 In
White, exercising the right of performance or display of the
Wheel of Fortune led to the violation of the right of publicity. In
addition, since the rights under § 106 are subject to the fair use
parody exception, 415 the exercise of the fair use parody excep-
tion also led to a violation of the right of publicity in White.416
408. White, 971 F.2d at 1399.
409. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1775 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
410. See supra text accompanying notes 115-32 for a discussion of Nurmi. See
supra text accompanying notes 313-27 for an analysis of Nurmi. See also White,
971 F.2d at 1405 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
411. White, 971 F.2d at 1405 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
412. See id. at 1404.
413. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); see supra text accompanying note 161 for a dis-
cussion of the subject matter of copyright. See supra notes 163-81 for a discussion
of preemption. See also note 180 and accompanying text for the application of the
second element of the preemption test by the court in Baltimore Orioles.
414. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988); see supra note 162 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the rights granted under § 106 of the Copyright Act. See also supra
note 181 and accompanying text for application of the third factor of the preemp-
tion test by the court in Baltimore Orioles.
415. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 107 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See also part II.F.3 for
a discussion of parody.
416. Factually, White is also analogous to Baltimore Orioles. The perform-
ances of the baseball players are analogous to Vanna White's performances on
Wheel of Fortune, since they are both part of a live performance that is fixed at the
time of transmission. See supra note 179. In addition, the baseball clubs and the
owners of the Wheel of Fortune are analogous in that they each own the copyright
to their respective broadcasts.
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Consequently, White's right of publicity claim should have been
preempted by the Copyright Act.
G. The Dissent's Choice of Law Analysis Was Flawed
In his dissent from the order rejecting the suggestion for
rehearing en banc, Judge Kozinski argued that the decision in
White conflicted with the Copyright Clause of the United States
Constitution417 through the application of the domicile choice of
law principle.418 He stated that "under the . . . Copyright
Clause, a state's intellectual property laws can stand only so
long as they do not 'prejudice the interests of other states.' "419
He noted that an overly broad right of publicity, such as the law
advanced by the White court, may interfere with more restric-
tive right of publicity laws of other states. He reasoned that
when the domicile choice of law principle was applied to a claim
brought by a California domiciliary, California right of publicity
law would be applied to adjudicate the claim, even where the
defendant is not a California domiciliary, and even when the
litigation was not in California.420
Judge Kozinski also noted that California law would apply
even if a resident of another state did not realize that his or her
conduct violated the right of publicity of a California domicili-
ary, because the common law right of publicity does not require
a knowing violation of another's right.421 He further asserted
that the unknowing violation of California law may be particu-
larly unfair when the celebrity is one of only local (California)
reputation, and the non-California resident violates that celeb-
rity's right of publicity.422 Commentator Felix Kent made simi-
lar arguments in his article on the White case.42
417. See supra note 156 for the text of the Copyright Clause.
418. White, 989 F.2d at 1518 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). See Kent, supra note
281, at 3; McCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 26, §§ 11.3(A), (D)(1-3). See also
supra notes 286-94 and accompanying text for a full discussion of Judge Kozinski's
"domicile argument."
419. White, 989 F.2d at 1518 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973)).
420. Id. at 1518-19 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also Kent, supra note 281, at
3.
421. See White, 989 F.2d at 1519; Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr.
342, 346 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). See supra text accompanying note 138.
422. White, 989 F.2d at 1519 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
423. See Kent, supra note 281.
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The situation envisioned by Judge Kozinski and Felix Kent
will not necessarily occur in the manner in which they claim.
The weakness in their argument is that they assume the domi-
cile choice of law principle will always be applied in right of
publicity cases where there is a choice of law issue. There are
several reasons, however, why this assumption is incorrect.
First, one case cited by both Judge Kozinski and Felix
Kent, Acme Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock,424 actually un-
dercuts their argument. Acme involved the question of whether
the right of publicity survived the death of a celebrity-in other
words, whether the right existed post-mortem. 425 This question
was one of personal property law, and California courts apply
the domicile choice of law principle to issues of personal prop-
erty law.426 The issue in White, however, was whether the
plaintiff's right of publicity had been infringed.427 The Acme
court noted that the question whether an existing right of pub-
licity had been infringed was one of tort or contract law.42s In
tort or contract cases, California courts may not necessarily ap-
ply the domicile choice of law principle, but may apply a princi-
ple that results in a different state's right of publicity law being
applied to adjudicate the claim.429 For example, California may
apply the "governmental interests analysis" to a question of
whether a right has been tortiously infringed.430 Thus, the
Acme case calls into doubt Judge Kozinski's and Felix Kent's
arguments that the domicile choice of law principle will always
be applied to choice of law issues in right of publicity cases in-
volving a celebrity domiciled in California and an out-of-state
defendant. Consequently, California's right of publicity law
may not always be applied. 431
424. 711 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1983); see White, 989 F.2d at 1518; Kent, supra
note 281, at 3; see also supra note 294 for a discussion of Acme.
425. Acme, 711 F.2d at 1539.
426. Id. at 1540-41.
427. White, 971 F.2d at 1397-99.
428. Acme, 711 F.2d at 1541 n.1.
429. Id. at 1541.
430. Id.
431. Indeed, of the most noted right of publicity cases applying the domicile
conflict of law principle, all were "post-mortem" right of publicity cases, deciding
whether the right existed, not whether it had been infringed. See, e.g., Joplin En-
ters. v. Allen, 795 F. Supp. 349 (D. Wash. 1992); Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Law-
rence, 66 N.Y.2d 910, 489 N.E.2d 744, 498 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1985), cited in,
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However, which California choice of law rules would be ap-
plied in an infringement case,4 2 and whether the results would
be as "onerous" as Judge Kozinski and Felix Kent predict are
questions that have not been squarely addressed by the Ninth
Circuit or California state courts. The situation remains fur-
ther complicated and unpredictable due to the morass of confus-
ing rules and principles comprising the conflict of laws
doctrine.43
V. Conclusion
The unfortunate result of the White decision is that Califor-
nia's common law right of publicity has been expanded to the
point where both bench and bar will be unsure of its bounda-
ries. Indeed, simply reminding viewers of a celebrity is now the
basis of a right of publicity claim in California. In addition, it is
unclear to what extent, if at all, the First Amendment and par-
ody constitute valid defenses to right of publicity claims. What
is clear is that Vanna White now has a property right in the
image of game show hostesses who wear sequined gowns, glit-
tering jewelry, and blond hair. Moreover, other performers may
similarly be able assert property rights in the attributes that
constitute their personae.
The White decision will also result in an increase in litiga-
tion by celebrities, a decrease in the value of certain copyright
licenses, and a restriction on the creativity and speech of adver-
tisers and others who utilize mass commercial media. The deci-
sion also upsets the careful balance that has been struck by
courts and legislatures between the rights of public domain
ideas owners to control their property's use and the rights of the
public to have access to public domain ideas for the enrichment
of society.4M If simply reminding viewers of a celebrity can
MCCARTHY ON PUBLICrrY, supra note 26, at § 11.3(D)(3); Acme Circus Operating
Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1983); Groucho Marx Productions v.
Day and Night Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982); Factors Etc. v. Pro Arts, 652 F.2d
278 (2d Cir. 1981).
432. See, e.g., supra notes 288, 294.
433. See MCCARTHY ON PUBLICITY, supra note 26, § 11.3(A) (quoting RicmAN
& REYNoLs, supra note 288, § 70(a)); see also supra note 288.
434. White, 989 F.2d at 1516 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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state a cause of action for violation of the right of publicity, that
balance has been upset indeed.
John R. Braatz*
* For my wife, Hatsu.
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